Input data and information sources
Claims, applications, tickets and websites come from outsiders. Claims, applications and customer requests concern specific people.
Also known as: AI agent, agentic AI
An AI agent breaks a task into steps and completes it largely independently using tools, interfaces and its own permissions in business applications.
Understand the use case
An insurer uses agents to prepare claims, German municipalities have trialled them, and a telecommunications company uses them in customer service.
This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.
System design and data flows
A task arrives, such as a claim, application or ticket.
Claims, applications, tickets and websites come from outsiders. Agents controlling a browser or the whole screen analyse screen content as images.
A language model plans steps, calls tools and interfaces, and evaluates the responses.
The model breaks an instruction into steps and selects suitable calls from the approved tools. An execution environment runs these calls and returns the results to the model. This can lead to further steps. Planning, actual tool execution and approval are distinct parts of the system.
The agent creates cases, edits records or presents a complete decision proposal to a person.
A generated result is newly worded or created. To assess it, the instruction and context on which it is based must remain identifiable.
Its actions change business applications immediately and can trigger payments, administrative decisions or customer responses.
Write or execution permissions allow the system to change a state within an application. Model responses, tool calls and changes actually executed must therefore be considered separately.
Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.
15 review first27 clarify9 baseline threats
The diagram shows the typical architecture. Select a component to see what happens there and adapt its features to your system. Enable “Analysis guidance” to see which threats need reviewing for this architecture. The page's checklist continues to describe the typical case.
None yet. Each change will appear here.
In this system design: 15 to review first, 27 to clarify, 9 baseline threats.
External access: Depends on your system
To clarify
Input: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
Third-party content: Present
Review first
AI model: Part of every AI system
Review first
Baseline for every AI system
Provider service: Present
Review first
To clarify
Document collection: Depends on your system
To clarify
Memory: Depends on your system
To clarify
Training and feedback: Depends on your system
To clarify
Other AI agents: Depends on your system
Tools and interfaces: Present
Review first
To clarify
Result: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
Business application or equipment: Present
person: Part of every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Affected person: Depends on your system
Unapproved AI services: Depends on your system
To clarify
Supply chain and technical foundations: 5 baseline threats applying to every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Edits and tests code in the repository
AI assistant in office applications
Helps a user in an office application without executing a sequence of steps independently
Customer service chatbots and voicebots
Answers requests in conversation and passes difficult cases to people
Claims, applications, tickets and websites come from outsiders. Claims, applications and customer requests concern specific people.
The language model controlling the agent generally comes from another provider.
Research agents search document collections or the internet; others work only with business application data. Some agents store intermediate results and findings for reuse in later tasks.
The agent calls programs, interfaces and searches itself, such as weather or policy data in claims handling. It creates cases, edits records or prepares payments, changing business applications.
Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.
Assess risks and determine measures
Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.
Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?
Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.
Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.
A total of 51 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.
A crafted ticket or claim contains instructions the agent treats as a task. It executes them with its system permissions, for example disclosing data or approving a case.
The agent has write access across several business applications despite needing only read access. An error or injected instruction then changes records or triggers payments.
Agentic AI / Autonomous Agents
The agent chooses an unforeseen approach and executes it step by step. It has already processed many cases by the time someone reviews the results.
An agent's tool accepts arbitrary inputs without checking who initiated the call. The agent thus reaches data and functions unrelated to its task.
Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.
Listed because of this characteristic
Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)
An instruction-following model can change behaviour at a particular time or event.
Listed because of this characteristic
Users can override the system's working instructions through their inputs.
Listed because of this characteristic
People requesting generated content may try to bypass intended limits.
Listed because of this characteristic
Carefully crafted queries can reveal system instructions, which must therefore contain no secrets.
Listed because of this characteristic
Complex or high-volume inputs can exhaust model computing resources.
Listed because of this characteristic
Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.
Listed because of these characteristics
Sensitive Information Disclosure
Confidential content can appear in answers, supplied context or logs.
Listed because of these characteristics
Exfiltration from ML Application
Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.
Listed because of these characteristics
Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)
Generated text can invent facts or distort them during rewriting.
Listed because of this characteristic
The target metric can improve while the underlying objective is missed.
Listed because of this characteristic
Up to 27 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system.
Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 27 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.
How your system is built
How you operate the system
An agent drafting responses to customers or citizens reaches people directly; purely background workflows do not.
If yes, add
Research agents search document collections or the internet; others work only with business application data.
If yes, add
If yes, add
Some agents store intermediate results and findings for reuse in later tasks.
If yes, add
At Allianz, seven specialised agents collaborate on each claim; simpler agents work alone.
If yes, add
Many agents connect tools and data sources through the Model Context Protocol (MCP).
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
Agents controlling a browser or the whole screen analyse screen content as images.
If yes, add
If yes, add
These questions arise for almost every AI system.
If yes, add
If yes, add
Each step calls the language model again; a loop can rapidly increase costs.
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.
Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.
For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.
Depending on use Review trigger since 2 August 2025.
In typical use Review trigger since 2 August 2026.
Depending on use Review trigger from 2 December 2027.
Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.
Applies since 2 February 2025.
Detailed obligations
Applies if the agent communicates directly with customers or citizens and it is not obvious that an AI is responding.
Applies since 2 August 2026.
Detailed obligations
Applies if the agent checks applications for public assistance benefits or prepares decisions on them for an authority.
Applies from 2 December 2027.
Detailed obligations
Applies if your organisation builds the agent itself and controls it with a large language model or another third-party general-purpose model.
Applies since 2 August 2025.
Detailed obligations
Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass
Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.
If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.
Does the system use a knowledge graph storing concepts and their relationships?
If yes, add
Allianz, The storm subsides, the AI agent cleans up, 3 November 2025 According to the deployer
Allianz states that seven specialised agents prepare claims in live operation. People decide on payments.
OECD Artificial Intelligence Papers No 65, Agentic AI in organisations, 2026
The OECD cites agents in use, including KDDI customer service and the Federal Ministry for Digital Transformation and Government Modernisation's SPARK and Agentic AI Hub.
OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications 2026
OWASP treats agentic applications as a distinct system class with risks including goal hijacking, tool misuse and privilege abuse.
Crafted tickets make internal agents execute third-party instructions.
Brave, Indirect Prompt Injection in Perplexity Comet
Researchers showed that an agentic browser could use injected instructions and the user's session permissions to capture an email address and one-time password.
Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured