Versatile AI Risk Assessment
Office work and knowledge management

AI assistant in office applications

Also known as: Embedded workplace AI assistant (copilot)

Staff invoke the assistant directly in email, word processing, spreadsheets and chat; it accesses mailboxes and file storage using their permissions.

Explore the interactive model

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A concise PDF covering how the system works, its data flows and points to investigate, ready to share.

The explanations and measures describe the typical system design. Extensive personal changes add an appendix.

Understand the use case

What defines this use case?

The assistant drafts emails, summarises meetings and documents, and answers questions about anything the user is allowed to see. The UK government has trialled it, an IT services company is introducing it, and a Dutch municipality already uses it.

This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.

System design
Knowledge assistant grounded in sources
Ability to act
Action permissions depend on integration
Fields of use
public administration, IT services
Also known as
Copilot, Microsoft 365 Copilot, AI in email and word processing

How it works, step by step

System design and data flows

  1. Input data

    A user asks a question or gives an instruction in email, word processing, a spreadsheet or chat.

    Incoming emails, invitations and shared documents also come from outsiders; EchoLeak required only a crafted email. Mailboxes, calendars and chats contain names, contact details and conversation content.

  2. Processing

    The assistant searches mailboxes, calendars and file storage using the user's permissions and passes the results to a language model.

    The office application supplies the model with the instruction and available working context, such as an open document or a selected message. The model produces a suggestion within that application. Which other files are included depends on the connected services and permissions.

  3. Results

    The assistant provides a draft, summary or answer with references to the content used.

    A generated result is newly worded or created. To assess it, the instruction and context on which it is based must remain identifiable.

  4. Use and impact

    The user sends or saves the output, incorporating it into emails, documents and decisions.

    Integration determines whether the result is simply displayed, adopted after approval or written directly into a business application. These variants differ in their data flows and permissions.

Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.

How the system is built

23 review first17 clarify9 baseline threats

InputProcessingResultImpact Externalaccess 04 Input 31 Third-partycontent 10 AI model 40 Providerservice 11 Documentcollection 21 Memory 01 Training andfeedback 02 OtherAI agents 00 Tools andinterfaces 04 Result 122 Business appor equipment 00 person 00 Affectedperson 00 AI serviceswithout approval 01 Externalaccess 04 Input 31 Third-partycontent 10 AI model 40 Providerservice 11 Documentcollection 21 Memory 01 Training andfeedback 02 OtherAI agents 00 Tools andinterfaces 04 Result 122 Business appor equipment 00 person 00 Affectedperson 00 AI serviceswithout approval 01
  • Present
  • Depends on your system
  • Absent
  • Review first
  • To clarify

In this system design: 23 to review first, 17 to clarify, 9 baseline threats.

Architecture as a list

How it differs from similar use cases

Data and information

Input data and information sources

Incoming emails, invitations and shared documents also come from outsiders; EchoLeak required only a crafted email. Mailboxes, calendars and chats contain names, contact details and conversation content.

Processing and operating environment

The office application provider supplies the language model and search service.

Storage and further use

The assistant searches mailboxes, calendars, chats and file storage for relevant content. It formulates answers from the emails and documents it finds.

Results and data sharing

Depending on the product, the assistant calls functions in other applications or extensions. Depending on the product and settings, the assistant sends emails, creates appointments and edits files itself, or only provides drafts.

Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.

Assess risks and determine measures

From understanding the system to analysing risks

  1. Define the system boundary

    Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.

  2. Investigate threats

    Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?

  3. Assess risk

    Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.

  4. Provide evidence of measures

    Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.

Key threats in the application context

  • 4 particularly important
  • 19 typical
  • 17 depending on the system
  • 9 for every AI system

A total of 49 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.

Priority review points

  1. Prompt Injection: Indirect

    An outsider sends an email containing hidden instructions that the assistant reads during its next search. It follows them even though the user has never opened the email.

  2. Exfiltration from ML Application

    Injected instructions make the assistant embed internal content in a link or image. When the application loads the image, the data reaches an external server, as happened with EchoLeak.

  3. Cross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB)

    Folders containing personnel or board records are accidentally shared with everyone. The assistant finds them and reveals their contents to anyone who asks.

  4. RAG-Specific Attacks (Document Poisoning)

    Someone places a document with false information in shared storage. The assistant cites it as a source and spreads the error in answers to many staff members.

19 further review candidates in the typical design

Other relevant threats

  1. Backdoor ML Model

    Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Uses another provider's model
  2. Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)

    An instruction-following model can change behaviour at a particular time or event.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Performs natural language tasks
  3. Prompt Injection: Direct

    Users can override the system's working instructions through their inputs.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Performs natural language tasks
  4. Jailbreaks

    People requesting generated content may try to bypass intended limits.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Performs natural language tasks
  5. Meta Prompt Extraction

    Carefully crafted queries can reveal system instructions, which must therefore contain no secrets.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Performs natural language tasks
  6. Model Denial of Service

    Complex or high-volume inputs can exhaust model computing resources.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Generates its own text
  7. Privacy Attacks

    Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Processes personal data
    • Processes confidential data
  8. Sensitive Information Disclosure

    Confidential content can appear in answers, supplied context or logs.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Processes personal data
    • Processes confidential data
  9. Hate Speech and Discrimination

    Open-ended generated content can contain discriminatory or hateful statements.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  10. Profanity

    Freely generated answers can use an inappropriate tone.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  11. Violence / Unsafe Actions

    Open-ended content can depict violence or assist dangerous actions.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  12. Controversial Topics

    Answers on controversial topics may require separate editorial review.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  13. Illegal Activities

    Open-ended content can facilitate unlawful acts. The required scrutiny depends on purpose and users.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  14. Harassment

    Open-ended content can be used for harassment.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  15. Unethical Actions

    Generated suggestions can cross ethical boundaries in the specific context.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  16. Social Engineering

    Generated images, voices and texts can deceive or impersonate people.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  17. Fraud

    Generated content can facilitate fraud, for example through forged messages or documents.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  18. Disinformation

    Synthetic content can be presented as authentic and spread misleadingly.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Generates its own text
    • Generates content from open-ended requests
  19. Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)

    Generated text can invent facts or distort them during rewriting.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Generates its own text

Up to 17 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system.

System features and open questions

Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 17 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.

How many threats a Yes adds
  • Added by this Yes

How your system is built

Does the system generate or edit images, sounds, voices or videos?

In some office applications, the assistant also generates images, for example for presentations.

If yes, add

Does the system remember content from earlier conversations or tasks and reuse it later?

Some products remember preferences and information from earlier conversations.

If yes, add

Does the system call other programs, interfaces or search services itself, even if only to read?

Depending on the product, the assistant calls functions in other applications or extensions.

If yes, add

Can the system change things itself, such as storing data, sending messages, initiating transactions or granting permissions?

Depending on the product and settings, the assistant sends emails, creates appointments and edits files itself, or only provides drafts.

If yes, add

Does the system process several input types together, such as text with images or speech?

If yes, add

Does the system generate code, scripts or database queries for further use?

In spreadsheets, the assistant also writes formulas and scripts.

If yes, add

How you operate the system

These questions arise for almost every AI system.

Controls and implementation

Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.

Review priorityPrompt Injection: Indirect3 measures
Review priorityExfiltration from ML Application3 measures
Review priorityCross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB)3 measures
Review priorityRAG-Specific Attacks (Document Poisoning)3 measures
Backdoor ML Model2 measures
Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)3 measures
Prompt Injection: Direct3 measures
Jailbreaks2 measures
Meta Prompt Extraction2 measures
Model Denial of Service3 measures
Privacy Attacks3 measures
Sensitive Information Disclosure3 measures
Hate Speech and Discrimination2 measures
Profanity2 measures
Violence / Unsafe Actions2 measures
Controversial Topics3 measures
Illegal Activities3 measures
Harassment3 measures
Unethical Actions3 measures
Social Engineering3 measures
Fraud3 measures
Disinformation2 measures
Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)3 measures

Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.

AI Act provisions

When AI Act provisions apply
  1. Art. 4: AI literacy

    For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.

  2. Art. 50 para. 4: Labelling deepfakes and published texts

    Depending on use Review trigger since 2 August 2026.

Applies to every AI system

Art. 4: AI literacy

Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.

Applies since 2 February 2025.

Obligations and details for Art. 4: AI literacy
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model

Detailed obligations

May apply in particular uses

Art. 50 para. 4: Labelling deepfakes and published texts

Applies if texts produced with the assistant are published on matters of public interest without human editorial review and responsibility.

Applies since 2 August 2026.

Obligations and details for Art. 50 para. 4: Labelling deepfakes and published texts
The general condition is
Applies if the system creates deepfakes or AI texts on matters of public interest are published without editorial responsibility.
Who bears the obligations
Deployer

Detailed obligations

Generally does not apply

Art. 50 para. 1: Disclosure of AI interaction

Staff knowingly invoke the assistant in their office application, making it obvious that they are using an AI system.

Obligations and details for Art. 50 para. 1: Disclosure of AI interaction
The general condition is
Applies if people directly write or speak with the system and it is not obvious that they are interacting with AI.
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Product manufacturer

Detailed obligations

Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass

Cross-cutting threats

Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.

Why these threats always belong on the checklist

Atypical system features

View 3 further questions

If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.

  • Does the system determine its next steps itself based on earlier results?

    The assistant handles individual instructions and does not plan its own sequence of tasks.

    If yes, add

  • Can people outside your organisation use the system, including without login?

    If yes, add

  • Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?

    If yes, add

Sources

Related use cases

Also in the field of Office work and knowledge management

Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured