AI threat catalogue Reliability and Responsible Use Production
Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)
AI language models sometimes produce content that sounds convincing but is simply made up (hallucinations), including citations, figures, sources, or events. These outputs appear just as confident as correct answers.
Description
Language models compute, word by word, the statistically most likely continuation of a text. They do not check whether a statement is true and have no concept of the difference between knowing and inventing. Where the model lacks information, it fills the gap with plausible-sounding but fabricated content, including invented scientific references, court rulings, statistics, or software libraries. This threat needs no attacker: it is a property of the technology and can occur in any deployment, especially for questions at the edge of its trained knowledge. It becomes risky wherever outputs flow unchecked into advice, legal matters, medicine, or journalistic content.
Possible impact
When employees or customers act on fabricated content, the result is poor decisions, rework, and liability exposure; in a publicly documented legal dispute, a company has already been held to its chatbot's incorrect statement. Invented statements about individuals also touch the GDPR principle of accuracy. Publicly known incidents damage trust in the company and its AI services.
Example
An airline's customer chatbot explained a refund policy to a traveller that had never existed. The company lost the ensuing legal dispute and had to honour the invented commitment; the case is publicly documented.
Recommended mitigations (6)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: A model, training, or data-processing method directly changes system behavior or robustness.
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Source attribution in outputs
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Cryptographic or machine-verifiable properties protect confidentiality, integrity, or provenance.
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Confidence scoring
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
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Fact-checking post-processing
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
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Clear user disclaimers
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typePeople & competence
Primarily technical: The application makes uncertainty, system boundaries, or safe next steps visible and supports informed decisions; complemented by human expertise and judgment.
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Avoid overconfidence in model training
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: A model, training, or data-processing method directly changes system behavior or robustness.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (11)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM04:2026 Supply ChainLLM04:2026 Supply Chain, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 27-32 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM04_SupplyChain.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM07:2026 MisinformationLLM07:2026 Misinformation, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 43-45 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM07_Misinformation.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.2 ConfabulationSection 2.2, p. 6 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.8 Information IntegritySection 2.8, pp. 9–10 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- EU AI Act Article 13(1), 13(3)(b)(ii), (iv), (v) Transparency and provision of information to deployersArticle 13(1), 13(3)(b)(ii), (iv), (v) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R15 Platzierung von Malware (Text)Kap. 4, R15, p. 22 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R4 Fehlende Ausgabequalität (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R4, p. 15 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM inference:3 WrongnessPDF p. 18, [inference:3:wrongness] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM LLMtop10:9 Model TrustworthinessPDF p. 13, [LLMtop10:9:model trustworthiness] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM raw:10 Query DataPDF p. 15, [raw:10:query data] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Provide instructions for use to deployers
Art. 13 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- Hallucination (confabulation) Plausible sounding but factually wrong output, inherent to the technology.
- RAG (retrieval augmented generation) The system retrieves relevant content and supplies it to the model as answer context.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Reliability and Responsible Use.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Particularly important for:
- Generative AI assistant for staffA draft cites a nonexistent provision, judgment or figure. If someone uses the text, the error enters correspondence to customers or citizens.
- AI knowledge assistant (enterprise search)If retrieval finds no suitable passage, the language model still produces an answer. An invented security rule or incorrect work step then looks like a manual quotation.
- Speech recognition and transcriptionDuring a pause or unclear speech, the model inserts a sentence never spoken. In a finding or decision, it is later treated as the person's statement.
- AI meeting minutes and conversation documentationThe language model attributes a statement to a client that they never made or adds a diagnosis. Once in the case file, the sentence is treated as established in later decisions.
- Machine translationThe model omits a negative or mistranslates a technical term while still sounding fluent. The meaning of a decision or instruction changes unnoticed.
- Text analytics for feedback and consultation responsesThe model summarises a theme barely present or presents a minority view as the majority. Readers relying only on the summary draw incorrect policy or product conclusions.
Typical for:
For 10 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it generates its own text. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)?
- AI language models sometimes produce content that sounds convincing but is simply made up (hallucinations), including citations, figures, sources, or events. These outputs appear just as confident as correct answers.
- Which mitigations help against Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)?
- The catalogue lists 6 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG), Source attribution in outputs and Confidence scoring.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations) touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9 and Art. 13 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system and Provide instructions for use to deployers. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/hallucinations/