AI threat catalogue Malicious Use for Attacks, Fraud and Disinformation Production
Malicious Software
Attackers use AI models to generate or improve working malware and attack tooling. This lowers the entry barrier: even perpetrators without advanced programming skills can prepare attacks this way.
Description
AI models with coding capabilities can write not only useful programs but also malicious code: for example ransomware, spyware, or exploit code, meaning code that deliberately takes advantage of security vulnerabilities. Attackers bypass the models’ built-in safeguards through jailbreaks (inputs that override a model’s safety measures) or switch to models without such restrictions. AI also helps to find vulnerabilities in software quickly and partly automatically and to turn them into usable attack paths. So far, security authorities have mainly observed an acceleration and simplification of existing attack methods; even this, however, noticeably lowers the entry barrier for perpetrators.
Possible impact
Companies must expect more attacks, developed faster, because the pool of potential perpetrators grows and attack tooling becomes easier to obtain. If such malware reaches the organization, the consequences include business interruption, encrypted or stolen data, and high recovery costs. If a company’s own AI system is misused to generate malicious code, the operator additionally faces liability and reputational questions.
Example
An attacker without advanced programming skills has a language model build a working piece of malware, including mechanisms to disguise it, and sends it to the HR department as a rigged job application attachment.
Recommended mitigations (5)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
-
Refusal training for malware code
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: A model, training, or data-processing method directly changes system behavior or robustness.
-
Static analysis of generated code
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
-
Dual-use evaluation
Governance & compliance- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Organization, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily a governance and compliance control: Binding rules, control objectives, or oversight define permitted use and accountability; complemented by binding workflows.
-
Monitoring for malicious code patterns
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators; complemented by binding workflows.
-
Red-teaming with security researchers
Organizational & process-based- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typePeople & competence, Technical
Primarily organizational and process-based: A planned, repeatable assessment with ownership and documented follow-up creates the protective effect; complemented by human expertise and judgment as well as technical implementation.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (6)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM01:2026 Prompt InjectionLLM01:2026 Prompt Injection, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 10-17 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM01_PromptInjection.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.9 Information SecuritySection 2.9, pp. 10–11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(b) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(b) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R12 Wissenssammlung und -aufbereitung im Kontext krimineller Aktivitäten (Text, Bild)Kap. 4, R12, p. 20 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R14 Generierung und Verbesserung von Malware (Text)Kap. 4, R14, p. 22 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
-
Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- Jailbreak Input that makes a model bypass its own safeguards.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Malicious Use for Attacks, Fraud and Disinformation.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Particularly important for:
- Coding assistantThe assistant suggests a nonexistent library, and attackers have published a malicious package under that exact name. Accepting the suggestion introduces malicious code into the organisation's software.
Typical for:
For 3 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it generates code or queries. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Malicious Software?
- Attackers use AI models to generate or improve working malware and attack tooling. This lowers the entry barrier: even perpetrators without advanced programming skills can prepare attacks this way.
- Which mitigations help against Malicious Software?
- The catalogue lists 5 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Refusal training for malware code, Static analysis of generated code and Dual-use evaluation.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Malicious Software touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9 and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
Assess this threat in your own system
The live demo contains all 52 threats of this catalogue, including the EU AI Act and GDPR assessment. The free single modules cover AI risk, the EU AI Act and GDPR. No sign-up; the assessment runs locally in your browser.
Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Malicious Software”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/malicious-software/