AI threat catalogue Malicious Use for Attacks, Fraud and Disinformation Production
Social Engineering
Attackers use AI to produce deceptively authentic, personally tailored scam messages, calls and pretext stories at scale. Familiar warning signs such as clumsy language disappear, making the deception considerably more convincing.
Description
Social engineering tricks people into revealing confidential information, making payments or installing malware. Generative AI amplifies this tactic considerably: language models write flawless phishing messages (fake communications designed to prompt a harmful action) tailored to individual recipients and their company, and provide scripts for fraudulent phone calls. Voice and video generators additionally imitate real people, such as managers or business partners. The attacks target people rather than technology, arriving by email, phone, messenger or video call. AI lowers the entry barrier and increases the volume, speed and quality of such attacks.
Possible impact
A successful deception can lead to fraudulent payments, stolen credentials and, in turn, compromised systems and data leaks. Beyond the financial damage, reporting and liability questions arise, for example when personal data is exposed. Staff in finance, HR and support roles are particularly at risk, and the trust of customers and partners in the company’s communication suffers as well.
Example
The accounting team receives an email that precisely matches the tone and writing style of the CEO; shortly afterwards a call arrives using a cloned version of the CEO’s voice: a supposedly confidential acquisition requires an immediate transfer. Attacks of this kind, known as CEO fraud, become far more convincing with AI-generated text and voices.
Recommended mitigations (5)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Detection of impersonation/pretext patterns
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
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Refusal for deceptive content generation
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing.
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Identity verification in sensitive workflows
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Machine-enforced identity, permission, or scope rules constrain unauthorized access and actions; complemented by binding workflows.
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User awareness training
People & competence- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Organization, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily a people-and-competence control: Trained users recognize deception and abuse patterns; audience, repetition, and effectiveness requirements support application.
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Anti-phishing detection
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (7)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.8 Information IntegritySection 2.8, pp. 9–10 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.9 Information SecuritySection 2.9, pp. 10–11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0048.002 Societal HarmATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0048.002 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 5(1)(a) Prohibited AI practicesArticle 5(1)(a); where the catalogue cites exploitation, compare Article 5(1)(b) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(b) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(b) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R11 Vortäuschen einer (medialen) Identität (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R11, p. 19 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Refrain from the prohibited practices
Art. 5 Abs. 1 · applies from 2 February 2025
Statutory roles: Provider, Deployer, Importer, Distributor, Authorised representative, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Prohibited practice.
These prohibitions have applied since 2 February 2025 and are unaffected by the deferral of the high-risk obligations. Infringements carry the highest fine bracket of the regulation.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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New prohibition: intimate depictions without consent
Art. 5 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 Buchst. ba, Art. 5 Abs. 1a, 1b · applies from 2 December 2026 · amended by Reg. 2026/1744
Statutory roles: Provider, Deployer, Importer, Distributor, Authorised representative, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Prohibited practice, System subject to transparency obligations.
This prohibition is new and was inserted by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744. It applies from 2 December 2026. For deployers, the prohibition applies only where the system is used for that very purpose.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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New prohibition: child sexual abuse material
Art. 5 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 Buchst. bb · applies from 2 December 2026 · amended by Reg. 2026/1744
Statutory roles: Provider, Deployer, Importer, Distributor, Authorised representative, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Prohibited practice.
Also newly inserted by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744, applying from 2 December 2026.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Malicious Use for Attacks, Fraud and Disinformation.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Typical for:
- Generative AI assistant for staff
- AI assistant in office applications
- Image, video and voice generation
For 6 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it generates new content from open-ended requests or generates its own text. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Social Engineering?
- Attackers use AI to produce deceptively authentic, personally tailored scam messages, calls and pretext stories at scale. Familiar warning signs such as clumsy language disappear, making the deception considerably more convincing.
- Which mitigations help against Social Engineering?
- The catalogue lists 5 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Detection of impersonation/pretext patterns, Refusal for deceptive content generation and Identity verification in sensitive workflows.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Social Engineering touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 5 Abs. 1, Art. 5 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 Buchst. ba, Art. 5 Abs. 1 UAbs. 1 Buchst. bb, Art. 9 and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Refrain from the prohibited practices, New prohibition: intimate depictions without consent, New prohibition: child sexual abuse material, Establish and operate a risk management system and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Social Engineering”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/social-engineering/