AI threat catalogue Agentic and Autonomous AI Production
Agent Memory Poisoning (Persistent Context)
AI agents with persistent memory carry information from earlier sessions forward as trusted context for future decisions. If that memory is manipulated, the effect outlasts the original interaction.
Description
Many agent architectures maintain long-term memory, such as a vector store, a notes system, or logged session summaries, that persists across interactions and is drawn on as context for future tasks. If an attacker injects false content into that memory, through an ordinary request, a processed document, or a manipulated tool result, the agent adopts it as learned, trusted context. Unlike one-off RAG-specific attacks, the manipulation here carries forward beyond the original session into future, independent interactions, often with other users.
Possible impact
A poisoned memory silently and persistently skews the agent's decisions, often with no visible trigger in the current conversation, which makes detection and root-cause analysis considerably harder. Every future session that draws on the corrupted memory is affected, not just the original interaction. The EU AI Act requires effective human oversight and technical resilience against manipulation for high-risk systems.
Example
A support agent with persistent memory stores learned preferences from handled tickets. An attacker submits a ticket with a hidden instruction to approve refund requests over EUR 10,000 without review going forward. The agent records this as a working instruction. That poisoned preference then applies to all future tickets from any customer.
Recommended mitigations (5)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Provenance tracking per memory entry (document origin, timestamp, source)
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Cryptographic or machine-verifiable properties protect confidentiality, integrity, or provenance; complemented by binding workflows.
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Segment memory storage by tenant and sensitivity level
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Architectural and runtime boundaries separate data, execution, or tenants and limit the spread of failures.
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Write gates with content validation before every commit to persistent memory
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing.
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Decay or downgrade unverified memory entries over time
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing.
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Snapshots and rollback capability for agent memory
Technical- Effect
- Impact-limiting, Restorative
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Versioned states or rollback mechanisms enable controlled recovery.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (9)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 ASI06:2026 Memory & Context PoisoningASI06 Memory & Context Poisoning, pp. 24–26 of the official PDF OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM01:2026 Prompt InjectionLLM01:2026 Prompt Injection, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 10-17 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM01_PromptInjection.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM05:2026 Data and Model PoisoningLLM05:2026 Data and Model Poisoning, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 33-37 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM05_DataModelPoisoning.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0080.000 MemoryATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0080.000 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 15(5) Accuracy, robustness and cybersecurityArticle 15(5), including the express references to data/model poisoning, adversarial examples/evasion, confidentiality attacks and model flaws European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 26(5) Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systemsArticle 26(5) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- GDPR Article 32(1)(b) Security of processingArticle 32(1)(b), read with Article 32(1) and 32(2) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- GDPR Article 5(1)(d) Principles relating to processing of personal data — accuracyArticle 5(1)(d) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Achieve accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity
Art. 15, Art. 42 Abs. 3 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028 · amended by Reg. 2026/1744
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
New: where a high-risk system falls within the scope of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements and meets its conditions, it is deemed compliant with the cybersecurity requirements of Art. 15. Duplicate evidence is therefore not required.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Monitor operation and suspend on risk
Art. 26 Abs. 5 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Deployer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- RAG (retrieval augmented generation) The system retrieves relevant content and supplies it to the model as answer context.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Agentic and Autonomous AI.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
For 9 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it remembers content beyond a single conversation. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Agent Memory Poisoning (Persistent Context)?
- AI agents with persistent memory carry information from earlier sessions forward as trusted context for future decisions. If that memory is manipulated, the effect outlasts the original interaction.
- Which mitigations help against Agent Memory Poisoning (Persistent Context)?
- The catalogue lists 5 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Provenance tracking per memory entry (document origin, timestamp, source), Segment memory storage by tenant and sensitivity level and Write gates with content validation before every commit to persistent memory.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Agent Memory Poisoning (Persistent Context) touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9, Art. 15 and Art. 26 Abs. 5 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system, Achieve accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity and Monitor operation and suspend on risk. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Agent Memory Poisoning (Persistent Context)”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/agent-memory-poisoning/