AI threat catalogue Agentic and Autonomous AI Production
Agentic AI / Autonomous Agents
AI agents plan multi-step tasks on their own and carry them out with tools such as email, databases, or code execution. The less human involvement there is, the further planning errors, manipulated content, and knock-on failures spread.
Description
An AI agent breaks a task into individual steps, autonomously calls tools and interfaces, and feeds the results into the next step. Several risks compound along this chain: planning and judgment errors propagate from step to step, and attackers can redirect the agent through content it reads while working, for example via prompt injection (hidden instructions in emails, documents, or web pages). A redirected or misguided agent then uses its legitimate tools for harmful actions, executes code, or sends data outside the organization. In systems of multiple agents, a single fault can cascade across further agents and workflows.
Possible impact
Everything the agent can reach is exposed: unwanted transactions, data leakage, deleted files, and outages of entire workflows. Cascading effects can spread the damage beyond a single system. For high-risk systems, the EU AI Act requires that humans can effectively oversee, intervene in, and halt the system; for large general-purpose AI models, the regulation names the degree of autonomy and access to tools among the factors influencing systemic risks.
Example
A development agent with command-line access works through tasks from project files. A crafted file contains hidden instructions that the agent treats as an assignment: it runs a delete command and destroys data on the system. Throughout, it stays entirely within its regular tool permissions.
Recommended mitigations (7)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Strict scope limitation of agent actions
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Machine-enforced identity, permission, or scope rules constrain unauthorized access and actions.
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Human approval gates for critical steps
Organizational & process-based- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typePeople & competence, Technical
Primarily organizational and process-based: A binding approval gate stops critical agent actions before execution; human judgment decides whether to approve or reject them.
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Action budgets and step limits
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Automated resource controls, budget limits, or runtime boundaries constrain overload, abuse, cost, and cascading failures.
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Comprehensive agent observability
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
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Reversible operations where possible
Technical- Effect
- Impact-limiting, Restorative
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Versioned states or rollback mechanisms enable controlled recovery.
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Simulation / dry-run before production
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
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Agent security sandboxing
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Architectural and runtime boundaries separate data, execution, or tenants and limit the spread of failures.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (14)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 ASI01:2026 Agent Goal HijackASI01 Agent Goal Hijack, pp. 9–11 of the official PDF OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 ASI02:2026 Tool Misuse and ExploitationASI02 Tool Misuse and Exploitation, pp. 12–14 of the official PDF OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 ASI08:2026 Cascading FailuresASI08 Cascading Failures, pp. 30–32 of the official PDF OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM01:2026 Prompt InjectionLLM01:2026 Prompt Injection, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 10-17 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM01_PromptInjection.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM03:2026 Excessive AgencyLLM03:2026 Excessive Agency, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 23-26 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM03_ExcessiveAgency.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM06:2026 Unbounded ConsumptionLLM06:2026 Unbounded Consumption, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 38-42 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM06_UnboundedConsumption.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 3.5 Security of AgentsSection 3.5, p. 54 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051 LLM Prompt InjectionATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0051 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 14(4)(d) Human oversightArticle 14(4)(d) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 26(5) Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systemsArticle 26(5) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(a) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(a) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R28 Indirect Prompt Injections (Text)Kap. 4, R28, p. 33 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML78 system:5 Error PropagationPDF p. 25, [system:5:error propagation] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Build in effective human oversight
Art. 14 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Monitor operation and suspend on risk
Art. 26 Abs. 5 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Deployer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- Prompt Injection Manipulated input or planted content redirects a language model.
- Agentic system (agentic AI) A system that uses a language model to carry out multi-step tasks on its own.
- Degree of autonomy How much a system decides and executes without human involvement.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Agentic and Autonomous AI.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Particularly important for:
- AI agentThe agent chooses an unforeseen approach and executes it step by step. It has already processed many cases by the time someone reviews the results.
Typical for:
For 2 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it determines its own work steps. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Agentic AI / Autonomous Agents?
- AI agents plan multi-step tasks on their own and carry them out with tools such as email, databases, or code execution. The less human involvement there is, the further planning errors, manipulated content, and knock-on failures spread.
- Which mitigations help against Agentic AI / Autonomous Agents?
- The catalogue lists 7 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Strict scope limitation of agent actions, Human approval gates for critical steps and Action budgets and step limits.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Agentic AI / Autonomous Agents touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9, Art. 14, Art. 26 Abs. 5 and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system, Build in effective human oversight, Monitor operation and suspend on risk and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Agentic AI / Autonomous Agents”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/autonomous-agents/