AI threat catalogue Attacks on the Running Model and Service Production
Adversarial Inputs
Attackers alter an input in a way that is minimal and imperceptible to humans, so that the AI model classifies it incorrectly. To the system a stop sign becomes something else, even though a person sees no difference.
Description
Adversarial inputs are specially crafted data that push the model to a wrong output while looking normal to humans. Attackers compute the necessary, usually tiny change with knowledge of the model (gradient methods) or probe it through many test queries; sometimes they practise on a rebuilt substitute model and transfer the attack. For text, a character swap (such as "$" for "S"), rare synonyms or interspersed character sequences often suffice. The attack happens at run time, not during training. This makes it possible to bypass AI-based protective functions such as malware and spam detection, hate-speech filters or biometric checks.
Possible impact
Important decisions come out wrong: malware judged safe passes detection, a prohibited input slips through the filter, a person is matched incorrectly by biometrics. In safety-critical applications such as image or traffic-sign recognition, this can directly endanger people. The EU AI Act explicitly requires high-risk systems to include measures against inputs designed to cause the model to make mistakes (adversarial examples, model evasion).
Example
An AI filter is meant to block offensive comments. An attacker replaces individual letters with similar-looking special characters and inserts meaningless character strings; the text stays readable for humans, but the filter no longer recognises the violation.
Recommended mitigations (4)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Adversarial training
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: A model, training, or data-processing method directly changes system behavior or robustness.
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Input validation and preprocessing
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing.
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Certified or randomised robustness methods and robustness testing
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: A model, training, or data-processing method directly changes system behavior or robustness.
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Ensemble models
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: A model, training, or data-processing method directly changes system behavior or robustness.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (14)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM07:2026 MisinformationLLM07:2026 Misinformation, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 43-45 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM07_Misinformation.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.9 Information SecuritySection 2.9, pp. 10–11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 MEASURE 2.7MEASURE 2.7, p. 30 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.022 EvasionTaxonomy Index, p. x; Section 2.2, pp. 11–18 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.025 Black-box EvasionTaxonomy Index, p. x; Section 2.2.2, p. 15 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0015 Evade AI ModelATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0015 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 26(5) Obligations of deployers of high-risk AI systemsArticle 26(5) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(a) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(a) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R27 Störung der automatisierten Verarbeitung von Inhalten (Text)Kap. 4, R27, p. 33 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R3 Fehlerhafte Reaktion auf Eingaben (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R3, p. 14 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML78 inference:3 Confidence ScoresPDF p. 20, [inference:3:confidence scores] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML78 input:1 Adversarial ExamplesPDF p. 19, [input:1:adversarial examples] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML78 input:2 Controlled Input StreamPDF p. 19, [input:2:controlled input stream] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Monitor operation and suspend on risk
Art. 26 Abs. 5 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Deployer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Attacks on the Running Model and Service.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Belongs on the checklist for every AI system. What to review for every AI system
Particularly important for:
- Intelligent document processing (IDP)Submitters control document content. A crafted invoice can introduce false bank details into a record.
- Automated content moderationUsers replace letters in insults with digits or change a known image by a few pixels. The post passes review and remains online.
- Credit scoring and creditworthiness assessmentSomeone who knows which details improve the score can tailor an application to just exceed the threshold. The system recommends credit it would have rejected with accurate information.
- Payment fraud detectionFraudsters use small payments to test what gets through, then adjust the amount, merchant and timing. The model subsequently treats later payments as unremarkable.
- Money laundering detection and sanctions screeningMoney launderers spread amounts across many accounts or vary name spellings. The system then fails to recognise the pattern or match the name to a list entry.
- Life and health insurance risk assessment and pricingSomeone who knows which details worsen risk classes can deliberately alter health answers. The system then recommends different policy terms than accurate answers would produce.
- AI-assisted candidate screeningCandidates can repeat job advertisement keywords or hide them in their CVs. The system then ranks an application more highly than the candidate's qualifications justify.
- Automated assessment of exam performance (essay scoring)Candidates learn which features raise scores, such as length, rare words or sentence patterns. The system then awards high marks to weak content.
- Remote biometric identification (facial recognition)Glasses, make-up, masks or edited photographs change the features the system compares. The person sought may go unrecognised or be mistaken for someone else.
- Biometric verification and video identificationAn impersonator presents a photograph, mask or synthetic video to the camera. If it defeats liveness detection, the system opens an account or barrier for the wrong person.
- Emotion recognitionPeople can deliberately control their expressions and tone when they know they are observed. The system then attributes calmness or honesty where neither exists.
- AI assistance in high-volume court proceedingsLaw firms handling mass claims can draft pleadings to make the system recognise or overlook particular features. Preparation then shifts in one party's favour.
- Language and dialect recognition in asylum proceduresThe person controls how they speak in the sample. Imitating another dialect or allowing background noise can steer the output.
- Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR)The system misreads a dirty, partly obscured or film-altered plate. Another vehicle receives the penalty, or a wanted vehicle escapes detection.
- Intelligent video analytics in public spacesKnowing camera positions allows movement or concealment that avoids pattern detection. Deliberately triggered false alarms can also occupy the control centre.
- Automated driving and driver assistanceAltered road signs or stickers on the road can deliberately mislead the camera. The vehicle then misreads a speed limit or lane and responds dangerously.
- AI-based cyberattack detectionAttackers adapt phishing emails and network traffic to appear normal to the model. The attack then slips past detection.
Frequently asked questions
- What is Adversarial Inputs?
- Attackers alter an input in a way that is minimal and imperceptible to humans, so that the AI model classifies it incorrectly. To the system a stop sign becomes something else, even though a person sees no difference.
- Which mitigations help against Adversarial Inputs?
- The catalogue lists 4 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Adversarial training, Input validation and preprocessing and Certified or randomised robustness methods and robustness testing.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Adversarial Inputs touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9, Art. 26 Abs. 5 and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system, Monitor operation and suspend on risk and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Adversarial Inputs”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/adversarial-inputs/