AI threat catalogue Attacks on the Running Model and Service Production
Model Theft
Attackers create a working copy of a proprietary AI model, either by querying it at scale or by breaking into the infrastructure. They steal the intellectual property without ever touching the original.
Description
A proprietary model embodies expensive development work. Attackers reproduce it in two ways. In the first, they query the model at scale through its normal interface and use the collected input-output pairs to train their own imitation, a so-called shadow or clone model that behaves almost identically. In the second, they break into the infrastructure and copy the model files directly. Side channels such as the hardware's electromagnetic emissions can also give details away. Motives include saving usage fees, building a competing product, circumventing export controls, or preparing further attacks.
Possible impact
The organisation loses intellectual property that often forms the basis of its business: a competitor gains comparable capabilities without bearing the development costs. The copied model also serves as a springboard for further attacks, for example to prepare adversarial inputs at leisure. The EU AI Act explicitly names model theft as a threat to be defended against and requires adequate protection of model weights and infrastructure for models with systemic risk.
Example
A provider offers a specialised classification model as a paid interface. A competitor sends millions of automated queries over several weeks, stores the answers and uses them to train its own model that replicates the service at a fraction of the cost.
Recommended mitigations (5)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Rate limiting and query quotas
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Minimization, randomization, uniform processing, or query limits reduce information gained from repeated observations; complemented by binding workflows.
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Watermarking
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Cryptographic or machine-verifiable properties protect confidentiality, integrity, or provenance.
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Model output perturbation
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Minimization, randomization, uniform processing, or query limits reduce information gained from repeated observations.
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Access control and authentication
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Machine-enforced identity, permission, or scope rules constrain unauthorized access and actions; complemented by binding workflows.
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Monitor for extraction patterns
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators; complemented by binding workflows.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (8)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM06:2026 Unbounded ConsumptionLLM06:2026 Unbounded Consumption, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 38-42 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM06_UnboundedConsumption.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.10 Intellectual PropertySection 2.10, p. 11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.031 Model ExtractionTaxonomy Index, p. x; Section 2.4.4, pp. 31–32; Section 3.3.2, p. 47 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0040 AI Model Inference API AccessATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0040 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0044 Full AI Model AccessATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0044 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(d) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(d) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R24 Modelldiebstahl (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R24, p. 29 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML78 model:5 Steal the BoxPDF p. 20, [model:5:steal the box] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Attacks on the Running Model and Service.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Typical for:
- Customer service chatbots and voicebots
- Recommender system
- Payment fraud detection
- Biometric verification and video identification
For 43 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it accepts queries directly through an interface or is accessible over a network. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Model Theft?
- Attackers create a working copy of a proprietary AI model, either by querying it at scale or by breaking into the infrastructure. They steal the intellectual property without ever touching the original.
- Which mitigations help against Model Theft?
- The catalogue lists 5 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Rate limiting and query quotas, Watermarking and Model output perturbation.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Model Theft touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Model Theft”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/model-theft/