AI threat catalogue Model and Training Data Manipulation Development
Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)
Malicious logic lies dormant inside the model and only activates later: on a set date, at a specific event, or in a particular environment. Until then, the system passes every test and review without raising suspicion.
Description
A sleepy agent (dormant malicious logic) is a special form of backdoor, hidden functionality planted inside the model: the embedded logic does not react to a special pattern fed in by the attacker but to conditions from the operating context such as the date, the user profile, or characteristics of the operating environment. As long as the condition is not met, the model behaves completely normally and clears acceptance tests, security reviews, and pilot phases without findings. The logic enters through poisoned training or fine-tuning data or through manipulated models from the supply chain. Research shows that such behavior can even survive additional safety training. It is precisely this delayed, condition-bound activation that makes the threat so hard to test for.
Possible impact
The organization puts a seemingly well-vetted system into production whose behavior later changes at a moment chosen by the attacker. The damage hits live operations: wrong results, manipulated recommendations, or unwanted actions, often in many places at once. Because acceptance testing and audits were clean beforehand, the incident is hard to attribute and shakes trust in testing and release processes.
Example
A purchased AI coding assistant delivers flawless suggestions throughout the entire pilot phase. From a cut-off date embedded in the model, it starts inserting inconspicuous security flaws into code for production systems. Research has deliberately created and studied exactly this kind of date-triggered behavior.
Recommended mitigations (6)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
-
Behavioral analysis under diverse conditions
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
-
Time-shifted testing
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
-
Adversarial evaluation across contexts
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
-
Runtime behavior monitoring
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators; complemented by binding workflows.
-
Model interpretability tools
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
-
Supply chain integrity verification
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Supply chain
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators; complemented by binding workflows.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (12)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM05:2026 Data and Model PoisoningLLM05:2026 Data and Model Poisoning, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 33-37 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM05_DataModelPoisoning.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.9 Information SecuritySection 2.9, pp. 10–11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 MEASURE 2.7MEASURE 2.7, p. 30 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.023 Backdoor PoisoningTaxonomy Index, pp. x–xi; Section 2.3.3, pp. 22–25; Section 3.2.1–3.2.2, p. 42 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.051 Model PoisoningTaxonomy Index, p. xi; Section 3.2.2, p. 42 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0018 Manipulate AI ModelATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0018 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0020 Training Data PoisoningATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0020 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 53(1)(a) Obligations for providers of general-purpose AI modelsArticle 53(1)(a) and Annex XI European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(a) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(a) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R19 Vergiftung des Modells selbst (Model/Weight Poisoning) (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R19, p. 26 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM model:4 TrojanPDF p. 17, [model:4:Trojan] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
-
Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Draw up the technical documentation of the model
Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. a, Anhang XI · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: General-purpose AI model, Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Provide information to downstream providers
Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. b, Anhang XII · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: General-purpose AI model, Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Respect copyright and summarise the training content
Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. c und d · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: General-purpose AI model, Model with systemic risk.
For models released under a free and open-source licence with publicly available parameters, the obligations under points (a) and (b) do not apply, but the copyright policy and the summary do. Models with systemic risk are excluded from this relief.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- Fine-tuning An existing model is trained further on your own data.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Model and Training Data Manipulation.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Typical for:
- Generative AI assistant for staff
- AI assistant in office applications
- AI knowledge assistant (enterprise search)
- AI meeting minutes and conversation documentation
- AI agent
- Text analytics for feedback and consultation responses
- Customer service chatbots and voicebots
- Image, video and voice generation
- Coding assistant
- Coding agent
For 11 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it performs natural language tasks. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)?
- Malicious logic lies dormant inside the model and only activates later: on a set date, at a specific event, or in a particular environment. Until then, the system passes every test and review without raising suspicion.
- Which mitigations help against Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)?
- The catalogue lists 6 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Behavioral analysis under diverse conditions, Time-shifted testing and Adversarial evaluation across contexts.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions) touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9, Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. a, Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. b, Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. c und d and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system, Draw up the technical documentation of the model, Provide information to downstream providers, Respect copyright and summarise the training content and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
Assess this threat in your own system
The live demo contains all 52 threats of this catalogue, including the EU AI Act and GDPR assessment. The free single modules cover AI risk, the EU AI Act and GDPR. No sign-up; the assessment runs locally in your browser.
Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/sleepy-agent/