AI threat catalogue Supply Chain and Provenance Supply Chain
Supply Chain – Models
Pre-trained AI models from external sources can be tampered with, carrying hidden malicious code or built-in backdoors. Anyone who adopts such a model imports the compromise straight into their own systems.
Description
Many organizations do not train AI models themselves but adopt pre-trained models from public platforms such as Hugging Face or from service providers. Attackers upload manipulated models there, swap out legitimate ones, or alter the model weights, the learned internal values of a model. Unsafe storage formats such as pickle open a particular attack path: merely loading such a model can execute hidden program code (a serialization attack). Built-in backdoors that only activate on specific inputs can even survive your own follow-up training. In normal operation the model appears unremarkable, so the manipulation is hard to detect without targeted checks.
Possible impact
A manipulated model can produce wrong or deliberately skewed results that the business then bases decisions on. Embedded malicious code additionally lets attackers take over systems and extract data. The organization risks operational disruption, breaches of documentation and cybersecurity duties under the EU AI Act, and a loss of trust if customers or business partners are affected by the compromise.
Example
Security researchers uploaded a well-known open-source language model in slightly altered form to a public model platform: it spread a specific piece of false information in response to certain questions while otherwise behaving completely normally. A company adopting this model without verification would hardly have noticed the manipulation.
Recommended mitigations (4)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
-
Model signature verification
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Supply chain
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Cryptographic or machine-verifiable properties protect confidentiality, integrity, or provenance; complemented by binding workflows.
-
Use trusted model repositories
Organizational & process-based- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training, Supply chain
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeTechnical
Primarily organizational and process-based: Defined selection, operating, or lifecycle procedures make the control binding and repeatable; complemented by technical implementation.
-
Scan models for malicious code
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators.
-
Use safe serialization formats (e.g., safetensors)
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Safe formats, restrictive defaults, or protective layers reduce unsafe execution paths and exploitable attack surface.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (17)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM04:2026 Supply ChainLLM04:2026 Supply Chain, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 27-32 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM04_SupplyChain.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM05:2026 Data and Model PoisoningLLM05:2026 Data and Model Poisoning, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 33-37 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM05_DataModelPoisoning.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.12 Value Chain and Component IntegrationSection 2.12, p. 12 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF GOVERN 6.1 GOVERN 6.1GOVERN 6.1, p. 24 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF MAP 4.1 MAP 4.1MAP 4.1, p. 27 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.026 Model PoisoningTaxonomy Index, p. x; Section 2.3.4, p. 26 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.051 Model PoisoningTaxonomy Index, p. xi; Section 3.2.2, p. 42 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0010 AI Supply Chain CompromiseATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0010 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0115.001 ModelsATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0115.001 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 25(4) Responsibilities along the AI value chainArticle 25(4), first subparagraph, as replaced by Article 1(12)(b) of Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 53(1)(a) Obligations for providers of general-purpose AI modelsArticle 53(1)(a) and Annex XI European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(d) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(d) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R1 Abhängigkeit vom entwickelnden/betreibenden Unternehmen (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R1, p. 13 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R19 Vergiftung des Modells selbst (Model/Weight Poisoning) (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R19, p. 26 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM model:4 TrojanPDF p. 17, [model:4:Trojan] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML78 alg:11 ParametersPDF p. 17, [alg:11:parameters] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML78 data:2 TransferPDF p. 14, [data:2:transfer] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
-
Support downstream providers
Art. 25 Abs. 2, Art. 25 Abs. 4 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028 · amended by Reg. 2026/1744
Statutory roles: Provider, Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 spelled out the initial provider duty to cooperate and at the same time created an exception: it does not apply where the initial provider has clearly specified that their system must not be turned into a high-risk system. Infringements of Art. 25(2) and (4) are now expressly subject to fines.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Draw up the technical documentation of the model
Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. a, Anhang XI · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: General-purpose AI model, Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Provide information to downstream providers
Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. b, Anhang XII · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: General-purpose AI model, Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Respect copyright and summarise the training content
Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. c und d · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: General-purpose AI model, Model with systemic risk.
For models released under a free and open-source licence with publicly available parameters, the obligations under points (a) and (b) do not apply, but the copyright policy and the summary do. Models with systemic risk are excluded from this relief.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
-
Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Supply Chain and Provenance.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Belongs on the checklist for every AI system. What to review for every AI system
Frequently asked questions
- What is Supply Chain – Models?
- Pre-trained AI models from external sources can be tampered with, carrying hidden malicious code or built-in backdoors. Anyone who adopts such a model imports the compromise straight into their own systems.
- Which mitigations help against Supply Chain – Models?
- The catalogue lists 4 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Model signature verification, Use trusted model repositories and Scan models for malicious code.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Supply Chain – Models touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 25 Abs. 2, Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. a, Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. b, Art. 53 Abs. 1 Buchst. c und d and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Support downstream providers, Draw up the technical documentation of the model, Provide information to downstream providers, Respect copyright and summarise the training content and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
Assess this threat in your own system
The live demo contains all 52 threats of this catalogue, including the EU AI Act and GDPR assessment. The free single modules cover AI risk, the EU AI Act and GDPR. No sign-up; the assessment runs locally in your browser.
Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Supply Chain – Models”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/supply-chain-models/