AI threat catalogue Privacy and Data Leakage Production
Cross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB)
On AI platforms that serve several customers on shared infrastructure, one customer's data can surface in another customer's answers when tenant isolation in the shared knowledge store is incomplete.
Description
Many AI applications look up knowledge via RAG (retrieval augmented generation, the practice of consulting a connected knowledge base) and store text for this purpose as numerical sequences (embeddings) in a vector database. When a platform serves several tenants, meaning customers or departments on the same infrastructure, filters and permissions must cleanly separate whose documents each query searches. If those filters are missing or storage areas are misconfigured, one tenant's search returns text passages belonging to another, and the model weaves them into its answer. This can happen in normal operation; attackers can additionally provoke it with targeted queries. The embeddings themselves offer no protection either, because the original text can largely be reconstructed from them.
Possible impact
One customer's confidential documents are disclosed to another, breaching contractual confidentiality commitments and, where personal data is involved, the GDPR, including notification duties and the risk of fines. For the data subjects concerned, this means their data ends up with unauthorised third parties. For the operator, customer trust in the entire platform is at stake.
Example
A software vendor runs an AI assistant for many corporate customers on a shared vector database. A missing tenant filter means that one customer's question about contract terms pulls passages from another customer's uploaded contract into the answer.
Recommended mitigations (6)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Strict tenant isolation in vector DB
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Data, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Architectural and runtime boundaries separate data, execution, or tenants and limit the spread of failures.
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Per-tenant namespaces / partitions
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Data, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Architectural and runtime boundaries separate data, execution, or tenants and limit the spread of failures.
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Query scoping at retrieval time
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Machine-enforced identity, permission, or scope rules constrain unauthorized access and actions.
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Encryption at rest per tenant
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Data, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Cryptographic or machine-verifiable properties protect confidentiality, integrity, or provenance.
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Access control testing across tenants
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents, Infrastructure, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators; complemented by binding workflows.
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Audit logs for retrieval operations
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents, Use & operations
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Software or analytical tools systematically produce and evaluate measurements, deviations, or attack indicators; complemented by binding workflows.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (10)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM02:2026 Sensitive Information DisclosureLLM02:2026 Sensitive Information Disclosure, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 18-22 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM02_SensitiveInformationDisclosure.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM09:2026 Vector and Embedding WeaknessesLLM09:2026 Vector and Embedding Weaknesses, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 50-54 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM09_VectorAndEmbeddingWeaknesses.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.10 MEASURE 2.10MEASURE 2.10, p. 30 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.015 Indirect Prompt InjectionTaxonomy Index, pp. x–xi; Section 3.4, pp. 50–53; Glossary, p. 110 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.036 Leaking information from user interactionsTaxonomy Index, p. xi; Section 3.4.3, pp. 52–53 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0025 Exfiltration via Cyber MeansATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0025 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0057 LLM Data LeakageATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0057 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d) Risk management systemArticle 9(1), 9(2)(a), 9(2)(d), read with Article 9(3) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- GDPR Article 25(1)–(2) Data protection by design and by defaultArticle 25(1) and 25(2) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R23 Embedding Inversion (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R23, p. 28 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Establish and operate a risk management system
Art. 9 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- RAG (retrieval augmented generation) The system retrieves relevant content and supplies it to the model as answer context.
- Embeddings Numerical vectors that represent content for similarity searches.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Privacy and Data Leakage.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Particularly important for:
- AI assistant in office applicationsFolders containing personnel or board records are accidentally shared with everyone. The assistant finds them and reveals their contents to anyone who asks.
- Police data analysis platformsThe platform combines cases that not every investigator may access. If search or graph permissions fail, investigators see people and incidents from other cases.
For 6 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it holds documents from several permission groups in one search store or searches its own document collection. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Cross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB)?
- On AI platforms that serve several customers on shared infrastructure, one customer's data can surface in another customer's answers when tenant isolation in the shared knowledge store is incomplete.
- Which mitigations help against Cross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB)?
- The catalogue lists 6 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Strict tenant isolation in vector DB, Per-tenant namespaces / partitions and Query scoping at retrieval time.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Cross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB) touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 9 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Establish and operate a risk management system. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Cross-Tenant Leakage (Multi-Tenant Vector DB)”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/cross-tenant-leakage/