AI threat catalogue Privacy and Data Leakage Production
Privacy Attacks
Attackers coax personal or sensitive information about the training data out of an AI model through carefully crafted queries, for example whether a specific person's data was used to train it.
Description
An AI model retains traces of its training data. Attackers exploit this by querying the model systematically through its normal input interface and analysing the answers statistically; they do not need to break into the IT environment. With membership inference they determine whether a specific person's data was part of the training set. With model inversion they reconstruct typical training content, such as a face from a facial recognition model. With attribute inference they derive sensitive characteristics of a person that the system was never meant to reveal. Even supposedly anonymised data sets can be linked back to specific individuals with AI support (re-identification).
Possible impact
The organisation breaches the confidentiality of personal data without any conventional intrusion, which can trigger notification duties, fines and claims by data subjects under the GDPR. Merely proving that a person was in the training data can harm them, for example with health data. Moreover, an AI model only counts as anonymous under data protection law if such attacks, carried out with reasonable means, are likely to fail; otherwise the model itself remains subject to the GDPR.
Example
A clinic trains a prediction model on patient data and offers it as an online service. Through targeted queries an attacker can prove that a specific person belonged to the study group for a rare disease, even though the model never outputs the person's name.
Recommended mitigations (5)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
-
Differential privacy in training
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Minimization, randomization, uniform processing, or query limits reduce information gained from repeated observations.
-
Output privacy filters
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing.
-
Query rate limiting
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Minimization, randomization, uniform processing, or query limits reduce information gained from repeated observations; complemented by binding workflows.
-
Data minimization in training
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Model & training
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Minimization, randomization, uniform processing, or query limits reduce information gained from repeated observations.
-
Anonymization and aggregation techniques
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Minimization, randomization, uniform processing, or query limits reduce information gained from repeated observations.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (19)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM02:2026 Sensitive Information DisclosureLLM02:2026 Sensitive Information Disclosure, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 18-22 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM02_SensitiveInformationDisclosure.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.4 Data PrivacySection 2.4, pp. 7–8 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.9 Information SecuritySection 2.9, pp. 10–11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.10 MEASURE 2.10MEASURE 2.10, p. 30 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.032 ReconstructionTaxonomy Index, p. x; Section 2.4.1, pp. 28–29 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.033 Membership InferenceTaxonomy Index, p. x; Section 2.4.2, pp. 29–30 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.038 Data ExtractionTaxonomy Index, p. xi; Section 3.3.2, pp. 46–47 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0024.000 Infer Training Data MembershipATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0024.000 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0024.001 Invert AI ModelATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0024.001 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(a) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(a) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- GDPR Article 25(1)–(2) Data protection by design and by defaultArticle 25(1) and 25(2) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- GDPR EDPB Opinion 28/2024, Section 3.2 EDPB Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI modelsSection 3.2, especially paragraph 43 and paragraphs 44–58, pp. 14–18 (anonymity; extraction/model attacks) European Data Protection Board (EDPB)Original
- BSI R13 Re-Identifizierung von Personen aus anonymisierten Daten (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R13, p. 21 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R2 Fehlende Vertraulichkeit eingegebener Daten (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R2, p. 14 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R22 Rekonstruktion von Trainingsdaten (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R22, p. 28 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R23 Embedding Inversion (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R23, p. 28 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM model:6 Training Set and Prompt RevealPDF p. 18, [model:6:training set and prompt reveal] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM raw:5 Data ConfidentialityPDF p. 15, [raw:5:data confidentiality] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML78 raw:1 Data ConfidentialityPDF p. 10, [raw:1:data confidentiality] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
-
Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Privacy and Data Leakage.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Particularly important for:
- Automated anonymisation and redactionNames are redacted, but occupation, place of residence and the time of the offence remain. Comparing the published judgment with other sources can still identify the person.
- Recommender systemThe model infers pregnancy or illness from purchases and viewed content. Tailored recommendations reveal this to others sharing the device.
- Personalised online advertising (behavioural targeting)The model assigns someone to an audience such as debt advice or fertility based on browsing. Advertisers indirectly learn information the person never supplied through that audience selection.
- Life and health insurance risk assessment and pricingThe model learned from many people's health data. Repeated queries can reveal whether a specific person or condition appeared in training.
- Remote biometric identification (facial recognition)Repeated image queries can reveal whether a particular person is stored in the database. That information alone may disclose that someone has been investigated.
Typical for:
- Generative AI assistant for staff
- AI assistant in office applications
- AI knowledge assistant (enterprise search)
- Speech recognition and transcription
- AI meeting minutes and conversation documentation
- Machine translation
- AI agent
- Intelligent document processing (IDP)
- E-discovery and technology-assisted review (TAR)
- Text analytics for feedback and consultation responses
- Customer service chatbots and voicebots
- Dynamic pricing
- Automated content moderation
- Credit scoring and creditworthiness assessment
- Payment fraud detection
- Money laundering detection and sanctions screening
- AI-assisted insurance claims handling
- AI-assisted candidate screening
- Algorithmic management
- Online proctoring
- Automated assessment of exam performance (essay scoring)
- Biometric verification and video identification
- Emotion recognition
- Risk-based review selection for applications and benefits
- Automated property valuation (AVM)
- Police data analysis platforms
- AI assistance in high-volume court proceedings
- Language and dialect recognition in asylum procedures
- Automatic number plate recognition (ANPR)
- Intelligent video analytics in public spaces
- AI-assisted medical image analysis
- Clinical decision support (such as early sepsis detection)
- AI support for emergency call handling
- Sales and demand forecasting
- Automated driving and driver assistance
- Coding assistant
- Coding agent
- AI-based cyberattack detection
For 4 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it processes personal data or processes confidential data. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Privacy Attacks?
- Attackers coax personal or sensitive information about the training data out of an AI model through carefully crafted queries, for example whether a specific person's data was used to train it.
- Which mitigations help against Privacy Attacks?
- The catalogue lists 5 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Differential privacy in training, Output privacy filters and Query rate limiting.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Privacy Attacks touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
Assess this threat in your own system
The live demo contains all 52 threats of this catalogue, including the EU AI Act and GDPR assessment. The free single modules cover AI risk, the EU AI Act and GDPR. No sign-up; the assessment runs locally in your browser.
Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Privacy Attacks”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/privacy-attacks/