Input data and information sources
Staff paste third-party emails, websites and documents for processing. Texts to be rewritten or summarised often mention customers, citizens or colleagues.
Also known as: Enterprise generative AI assistant
Staff draft, revise, translate and shorten texts using a language model their organisation provides in a secured environment.
Understand the use case
They give instructions in natural language and receive drafts to review and reuse themselves. A German state administration, the Federal Employment Agency and a city administration use these assistants.
This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.
System design and data flows
Staff enter an instruction and attach texts or files if needed.
Staff paste third-party emails, websites and documents for processing. Many assistants accept images, tables or speech as well as text.
A language model reads the instruction and material and formulates an answer.
The language model processes the instruction together with the supplied context and generates the text step by step. It does not automatically distinguish a substantiated statement from plausible wording. Searching approved sources is an additional processing step, where this capability is integrated.
It returns a draft, summary or translation.
A generated result is newly worded or created. To assess it, the instruction and context on which it is based must remain identifiable.
Staff incorporate the text into letters, notes or presentations used internally or externally.
The model supplies information for subsequent use. Selection, adoption or a professional decision in the following workflow is a separate step and should not automatically be attributed to the model.
Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.
22 review first15 clarify8 baseline threats
The diagram shows the typical architecture. Select a component to see what happens there and adapt its features to your system. Enable “Analysis guidance” to see which threats need reviewing for this architecture. The page's checklist continues to describe the typical case.
None yet. Each change will appear here.
In this system design: 22 to review first, 15 to clarify, 8 baseline threats.
External access: Depends on your system
To clarify
Input: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
Third-party content: Present
Review first
AI model: Part of every AI system
Review first
Baseline for every AI system
Provider service: Present
Review first
To clarify
Document collection: Depends on your system
To clarify
Memory: Depends on your system
To clarify
Training and feedback: Depends on your system
To clarify
Tools and interfaces: Depends on your system
To clarify
Result: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
person: Part of every AI system
Review first
Affected person: Depends on your system
Unapproved AI services: Depends on your system
To clarify
Supply chain and technical foundations: 5 baseline threats applying to every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
AI assistant in office applications
Accesses mailboxes, calendars and storage using the signed-in user's permissions
AI knowledge assistant (enterprise search)
Answers from a defined document collection and cites the sources
Text analytics for feedback and consultation responses
Analyses many free-text survey, complaint or consultation responses together
Staff paste third-party emails, websites and documents for processing. Texts to be rewritten or summarised often mention customers, citizens or colleagues.
The language model generally comes from another provider, even when hosted internally.
Some assistants search uploaded files or the internet. Some assistants remember information from earlier conversations and consult it later.
Some assistants initiate web searches or call other services themselves. If a cloud service hosts the language model, inputs leave the organisation's environment.
Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.
Assess risks and determine measures
Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.
Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?
Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.
Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.
A total of 45 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.
A staff member summarises an incoming email containing hidden instructions. The assistant follows them and returns a distorted summary or misleading recommendation.
Sensitive Information Disclosure
Staff paste personnel records, contracts or source code for processing. If the service stores the inputs or sends them to its provider, confidential content leaves the organisation.
Drafts sound confident and read smoothly. People who accept them under time pressure may stop checking content and sources.
Factual Inconsistencies (Hallucinations)
A draft cites a nonexistent provision, judgment or figure. If someone uses the text, the error enters correspondence to customers or citizens.
Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.
Listed because of this characteristic
Sleepy Agent (Time/Event-Triggered Hidden Instructions)
An instruction-following model can change behaviour at a particular time or event.
Listed because of this characteristic
Users can override the system's working instructions through their inputs.
Listed because of this characteristic
People requesting generated content may try to bypass intended limits.
Listed because of this characteristic
Carefully crafted queries can reveal system instructions, which must therefore contain no secrets.
Listed because of this characteristic
Complex or high-volume inputs can exhaust model computing resources.
Listed because of this characteristic
Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.
Listed because of these characteristics
Exfiltration from ML Application
Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.
Listed because of this characteristic
Hate Speech and Discrimination
Open-ended generated content can contain discriminatory or hateful statements.
Listed because of these characteristics
Freely generated answers can use an inappropriate tone.
Listed because of these characteristics
Open-ended content can depict violence or assist dangerous actions.
Listed because of these characteristics
Answers on controversial topics may require separate editorial review.
Listed because of these characteristics
Open-ended content can facilitate unlawful acts. The required scrutiny depends on purpose and users.
Listed because of these characteristics
Open-ended content can be used for harassment.
Listed because of these characteristics
Generated suggestions can cross ethical boundaries in the specific context.
Listed because of these characteristics
Generated images, voices and texts can deceive or impersonate people.
Listed because of these characteristics
Generated content can facilitate fraud, for example through forged messages or documents.
Listed because of these characteristics
Synthetic content can be presented as authentic and spread misleadingly.
Listed because of these characteristics
Up to 15 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. One of these is particularly important here and is therefore listed above.
Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 15 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.
How your system is built
How you operate the system
Some assistants also generate images on request; text-only assistants do not.
If yes, add
Some assistants search uploaded files or the internet.
If yes, add
If yes, add
Some assistants remember information from earlier conversations and consult it later.
If yes, add
Some assistants initiate web searches or call other services themselves.
If yes, add
Most deployers use the language model unchanged; some fine-tune it on their own texts.
If yes, add
If yes, add
Staff ratings of answers can contribute to service improvements.
If yes, add
Many assistants accept images, tables or speech as well as text.
If yes, add
Staff also request spreadsheet formulas, scripts or database queries.
If yes, add
Some assistants execute code themselves, for example to analyse spreadsheets.
If yes, add
These questions arise for almost every AI system.
If yes, add
If yes, add
With a cloud service, every request costs money.
If yes, add
If yes, add
Without an approved assistant, staff often use public services with private accounts.
If yes, add
Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.
Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.
For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.
Depending on use Review trigger since 2 August 2025.
Depending on use Review trigger since 2 August 2026.
Depending on use Review trigger since 2 August 2026.
Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.
Applies since 2 February 2025.
Detailed obligations
Applies if your organisation develops the assistant itself and provides it under its own name.
Applies since 2 August 2026.
Detailed obligations
Applies if texts produced with the assistant are published on matters of public interest without human editorial review and responsibility.
Applies since 2 August 2026.
Detailed obligations
Applies if your organisation incorporates a large language model or another third-party general-purpose model into its own assistant.
Applies since 2 August 2025.
Detailed obligations
Staff knowingly invoke the assistant, making it obvious that they are using an AI system.
Detailed obligations
Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass
Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.
If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.
Does the system use a knowledge graph storing concepts and their relationships?
If yes, add
Does the system determine its next steps itself based on earlier results?
Each instruction stands alone; the assistant does not plan its own sequence of tasks.
If yes, add
Does the system delegate tasks to other AI agents or incorporate their results?
If yes, add
Is the system connected to tools or data sources through the Model Context Protocol (MCP)?
If yes, add
Do documents from several customers, departments or permission groups share one search store?
If yes, add
Can people outside your organisation use the system, including without login?
The assistant is available only to staff, rather than customers or citizens.
If yes, add
Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?
If yes, add
Baden-Württemberg State Ministry, F13 AI assistant becomes open-source software, 23 July 2025
All state administration staff can use F13 to chat, summarise texts and research information.
Dutch Algorithm Register, ChatAmsterdam, Gemeente Amsterdam
Amsterdam operates a generative assistant in a secured environment.
Federal Employment Agency, List of AI applications, 26 January 2026 (published via Table.Media)
The agency provides all staff with a generative AI solution that adapts texts to its writing guide.
Federal Statistical Office (Destatis), AI-using enterprises by technology type, 2025
Among AI-using companies, 35 per cent use natural language generation technologies.
Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Generative AI models, 2025
The BSI explains large language models and their risks for businesses and public authorities.
AI Incident Database, Incident 768 (Samsung)
Samsung staff entered source code and meeting notes into ChatGPT.
Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured