AI threat catalogue Prompt Attacks and Guardrail Evasion Production
Prompt Injection – Indirect
Malicious instructions hide inside external content such as documents, web pages, or emails. When the AI system processes that content in normal operation, it carries out the hidden commands unnoticed.
Description
In an indirect prompt injection, the manipulation comes not from the user but from third parties who plant prepared content. The instructions are disguised, for example as white text on a white background, in zero-size font, or inside a video transcript. When the model pulls in such sources, say while summarizing a web page or working in a RAG system (retrieval augmented generation) that draws on external documents to answer questions, it treats the hidden text as a command. The person harmed is usually the one who trusts the system, not the attacker.
Possible impact
The system can distort summaries, steer users toward harmful links, or funnel confidential data to an outside address, for instance by loading external images. In connected systems, hidden commands can send emails from the victim's mailbox or trigger further actions. This harms data protection, operations, and trust.
Example
An employee asks the AI system to summarize an incoming email. The message contains invisible text instructing the system to send the prior chat history to an external address. The system follows the hidden instruction without anyone noticing.
Recommended mitigations (5)
Compare effects and implementation levels. Expand each entry for the additional classification and rationale.
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Content source validation
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing.
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Sandboxed content processing
Technical- Effect
- Preventive, Impact-limiting
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents, Infrastructure
Classification and rationale
Primarily technical: Architectural and runtime boundaries separate data, execution, or tenants and limit the spread of failures.
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Output filtering and review
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: System-enforced inspection, transformation, or blocking rules stop or neutralize disallowed content before further processing; complemented by binding workflows.
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Limit tool access in RAG contexts
Technical- Effect
- Preventive
- Implementation level
- Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Machine-enforced identity, permission, or scope rules constrain unauthorized access and actions; complemented by binding workflows.
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Provenance tracking for retrieved content
Technical- Effect
- Detective
- Implementation level
- Data, Application, API & agents
Classification and rationale
Complementary control typeOrganizational & process-based
Primarily technical: Cryptographic or machine-verifiable properties protect confidentiality, integrity, or provenance; complemented by binding workflows.
Framework mappings
Verified locations in OWASP, NIST AI RMF, MITRE ATLAS, the EU AI Act and further frameworks. The mappings are taxonomic, not evidence of compliance.
Verified references (12)
Every reference states the framework, the exact location and the publishing organisation.
- OWASP LLM Top 10 LLM01:2026 Prompt InjectionLLM01:2026 Prompt Injection, OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications 2026 v1.0, pp. 10-17 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22109015); canonical text 2026/final/LLM01_PromptInjection.md at commit 7e144e05 OWASP FoundationOriginal
- NIST AI RMF Section 2.9 Information SecuritySection 2.9, pp. 10–11 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- NIST AI RMF NISTAML.015 Indirect Prompt InjectionTaxonomy Index, pp. x–xi; Section 3.4, pp. 50–53; Glossary, p. 110 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)Original
- MITRE ATLAS AML.T0051.001 IndirectATLAS-2026.09.yaml technique object with id AML.T0051.001 (content release 2026.09, format-version 6.0.0) MITREOriginal
- EU AI Act Article 14(4)(d) Human oversightArticle 14(4)(d) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- EU AI Act Article 55(1)(a) Obligations of providers of general-purpose AI models with systemic riskArticle 55(1)(a) European Union (EUR-Lex)Original
- BSI R28 Indirect Prompt Injections (Text)Kap. 4, R28, p. 33 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R3 Fehlerhafte Reaktion auf Eingaben (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R3, p. 14 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BSI R7 Fehlende Reproduzierbarkeit und Erklärbarkeit (Text, Bild, Video)Kap. 4, R7, p. 17 Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM input:2 Prompt InjectionPDF p. 16, [input:2:prompt injection] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM LLMtop10:5 Prompt ManipulationPDF p. 13, [LLMtop10:5:prompt manipulation] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
- BIML BIML-LLM raw:10 Query DataPDF p. 15, [raw:10:query data] Berryville Institute of Machine Learning (BIML)Original
EU AI Act obligations related to this threat
The obligations from the obligations compass whose articles the catalogue maps to this threat. Each leads to its entry with core, action step and evidence; whether it applies to you depends on role and risk class.
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Build in effective human oversight
Art. 14 · applies from Annex III: 2 December 2027 · Annex I: 2 August 2028
Statutory roles: Provider, Product manufacturer. Classes: High-risk under Annex III, High-risk as a product or safety component.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
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Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks
Art. 55 · applies from 2 August 2025
Statutory roles: Provider of a general-purpose AI model. Classes: Model with systemic risk.
This reference is a review prompt. A threat match alone does not establish applicability.
All 62 obligations by role, risk class and deadline in the obligations compass
Terms on this page
Glossary terms that occur in this entry. Every link leads to the full explanation.
- Prompt Injection Manipulated input or planted content redirects a language model.
- RAG (retrieval augmented generation) The system retrieves relevant content and supplies it to the model as answer context.
Related threats
More entries from the topic group Prompt Attacks and Guardrail Evasion.
Matching use cases
This list shows where to review this threat, rather than how high the risk is.
Particularly important for:
- Generative AI assistant for staffA staff member summarises an incoming email containing hidden instructions. The assistant follows them and returns a distorted summary or misleading recommendation.
- AI assistant in office applicationsAn outsider sends an email containing hidden instructions that the assistant reads during its next search. It follows them even though the user has never opened the email.
- AI knowledge assistant (enterprise search)A manufacturer's manual or chat message contains hidden instructions. The assistant follows them and discloses content from other documents, as demonstrated with Slack AI.
- AI agentA crafted ticket or claim contains instructions the agent treats as a task. It executes them with its system permissions, for example disclosing data or approving a case.
- Text analytics for feedback and consultation responsesAn interest group submits many responses containing hidden instructions. Analysis then weights its position more heavily than the response count warrants.
- Coding assistantA crafted file in an external project or a dependency comment contains hidden instructions. The assistant then suggests insecure code or discloses its context.
- Coding agentA ticket, README file or website contains hidden instructions. The agent executes them with its permissions, for example deleting files or reading credentials.
Typical for:
- AI meeting minutes and conversation documentation
- Customer service chatbots and voicebots
- Image, video and voice generation
For 11 further use cases, relevance depends on the system design, for example whether it performs natural language tasks. Show these use cases
Frequently asked questions
- What is Prompt Injection – Indirect?
- Malicious instructions hide inside external content such as documents, web pages, or emails. When the AI system processes that content in normal operation, it carries out the hidden commands unnoticed.
- Which mitigations help against Prompt Injection – Indirect?
- The catalogue lists 5 mitigations, each with control type, effect and implementation level. First among them are Content source validation, Sandboxed content processing and Output filtering and review.
- Which EU AI Act obligations does Prompt Injection – Indirect touch?
- The catalogue maps this threat to Art. 14 and Art. 55 of the EU AI Act. In the obligations compass this leads to: Build in effective human oversight and Evaluate and mitigate systemic risks. Whether an obligation applies depends on role, risk class and deadline.
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Cite this entry
For reports, policies or internal documents; the link leads directly to this entry.
“Prompt Injection – Indirect”. Versatile AI Risk Assessment, AI threat catalogue, as of October 2026. https://www.versatile-ai-risk-assessment.com/en/wissensbasis/threats/prompt-injection-indirect/