Versatile AI Risk Assessment
Administration, justice and public safety

Risk-based review selection for applications and benefits

Also known as: Risk scoring for benefit and grant applications

Authorities assess applications or payments for error or fraud risk and use this to select cases for closer review.

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A concise PDF covering how the system works, its data flows and points to investigate, ready to share.

The explanations and measures describe the typical system design. Extensive personal changes add an appendix.

Understand the use case

What defines this use case?

When processing many applications, only some receive detailed checks; a model suggests which ones. UK and Dutch authorities use these models. In the Dutch childcare benefits scandal, thousands of families were wrongly suspected.

This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.

System design
Analysis and processing
Ability to act
Action permissions depend on integration
Fields of use
social services, grant programmes
Also known as
risk selection, welfare fraud risk assessment, case selection

How it works, step by step

System design and data flows

  1. Input data

    The model receives application information, earlier applications and payments, and other business system data.

    Applicants supply the application information themselves. The system assesses specific individuals' or companies' applications and information.

  2. Processing

    The model compares the application with earlier cases and calculates error or fraud risk.

    The system processes information from applications and other approved records to estimate the need for review. A selection rule then prioritises cases for closer investigation. Selection for review, establishing the facts and deciding on a benefit are distinct procedural steps.

  3. Results

    Each application receives a risk score, with cases for closer review flagged.

    The result describes the defined model task. A match, category or forecast acquires its professional significance only in conjunction with the underlying data and intended use.

  4. Use and impact

    Caseworkers review flagged cases, request evidence and decide on approval, reduction or recovery.

    Integration determines whether the result is simply displayed, adopted after approval or written directly into a business application. These variants differ in their data flows and permissions.

Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.

How the system is built

8 review first9 clarify7 baseline threats

InputProcessingResultImpact Externalaccess 04 Input 30 Third-partycontent 00 AI model 01 Providerservice 02 Documentcollection 00 Memory 00 Training andfeedback 30 OtherAI agents 00 Tools andinterfaces 00 Result 10 Business appor equipment 01 person 10 Affectedperson 00 AI serviceswithout approval 01 Externalaccess 04 Input 30 Third-partycontent 00 AI model 01 Providerservice 02 Documentcollection 00 Memory 00 Training andfeedback 30 OtherAI agents 00 Tools andinterfaces 00 Result 10 Business appor equipment 01 person 10 Affectedperson 00 AI serviceswithout approval 01
  • Present
  • Depends on your system
  • Absent
  • Review first
  • To clarify

In this system design: 8 to review first, 9 to clarify, 7 baseline threats.

Architecture as a list

How it differs from similar use cases

Data and information

Input data and information sources

Applicants supply the application information themselves. The system assesses specific individuals' or companies' applications and information.

Processing and operating environment

The model processes the inputs. Whether it runs internally or with a service provider must be established for the specific implementation.

Storage and further use

Authorities train these models on their own past cases. Results of model-triggered checks become new training examples.

Results and data sharing

Depending on the authority, selection automatically stops a payment or only refers the case to staff.

Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.

Assess risks and determine measures

From understanding the system to analysing risks

  1. Define the system boundary

    Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.

  2. Investigate threats

    Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?

  3. Assess risk

    Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.

  4. Provide evidence of measures

    Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.

Key threats in the application context

  • 3 particularly important
  • 5 typical
  • 9 depending on the system
  • 7 additional threats for every AI system

A total of 24 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.

Also review: whether the system disadvantages groups

Check whether selection, ranking or assessment disadvantages people with protected characteristics, such as sex, age or origin.

Priority review points

  1. Overreliance

    Reviewers can assume something is wrong with a selected case. Selection for review becomes suspicion, as in the Dutch childcare benefits scandal.

  2. Training Data Poisoning

    The cases reviewed and used for training are mainly those the model selected itself. This confirms earlier assumptions and increasingly targets groups already selected more often.

  3. Insecure Output Handling

    Selection passes into the business system and can stop payments. An incorrect risk score delays benefits for someone who depends on them.

5 further review candidates in the typical design

Other relevant threats

  1. Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning

    Falsified training labels can deliberately shift model outputs.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Learns from examples with correct answers
    • Uses operational feedback
  2. Backdoor ML Model

    Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Learns from your own data
  3. Privacy Attacks

    Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Processes personal data
    • Processes confidential data
  4. Sensitive Information Disclosure

    Confidential content can appear in answers, supplied context or logs.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Processes personal data
    • Processes confidential data
  5. Exfiltration from ML Application

    Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Processes confidential data

Up to 9 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. Two of these are particularly important here and are therefore listed above.

System features and open questions

Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 9 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.

How many threats a Yes adds
  • Added by this Yes

How your system is built

  1. Changes data or triggers processes1 threat
  2. Optimises a specified metric1 threat

How your system is built

Can the system change things itself, such as storing data, sending messages, initiating transactions or granting permissions?

Depending on the authority, selection automatically stops a payment or only refers the case to staff.

If yes, add

Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?

A model configured to maximise findings per check pursues an authority's objective.

If yes, add

How you operate the system

These questions arise for almost every AI system.

Controls and implementation

Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.

Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.

AI Act provisions

When AI Act provisions apply
  1. Art. 4: AI literacy

    For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.

  2. Art. 5 para. 1 point c: Social scoring

    Depending on use Review trigger since 2 February 2025.

  3. Annex III no. 5 point a: Public assistance benefits

    In typical use Review trigger from 2 December 2027.

Applies to every AI system

Art. 4: AI literacy

Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.

Applies since 2 February 2025.

Obligations and details for Art. 4: AI literacy
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model

Detailed obligations

May apply in typical use

Annex III no. 5 point a: Public assistance benefits

Applies if an authority uses the system to assess entitlement to public assistance benefits, for example by selecting applications for closer review, or to reduce or recover benefits.

Applies from 2 December 2027.

Obligations and details for Annex III no. 5 point a: Public assistance benefits
The general condition is
Applies if authorities or bodies acting for them use the system to assess eligibility for public benefits and services, or to grant, reduce or recover them.
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Product manufacturer

Detailed obligations

May apply in particular uses

Art. 5 para. 1 point c: Social scoring

Applies if the system scores people over time by social behaviour or personal characteristics, causing disadvantages in other contexts or disproportionate disadvantages.

Applies since 2 February 2025.

Obligations and details for Art. 5 para. 1 point c: Social scoring
The general condition is
Applies if the system scores people over time by social behaviour or personal characteristics, causing harm in unrelated areas of life or disproportionate harm.
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Importer, Distributor, Authorised representative, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model

Detailed obligations

Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass

Cross-cutting threats

Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.

Why these threats always belong on the checklist

Atypical system features

View 17 further questions

If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.

Sources

Related use cases

Also in the field of Administration, justice and public safety

Often used together with

Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured