Input data and information sources
Outsiders can obscure, dirty or falsify plates and vehicles in public spaces. A plate links through the vehicle register to its registered keeper.
Cameras capture vehicle number plates, and the system automatically checks them against registration or police search data.
Understand the use case
Fixed or vehicle-mounted cameras capture passing or parked vehicles; image recognition reads their plates. Dutch municipalities use this to check parking rights, while police check plates against search databases.
This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.
System design and data flows
Cameras capture passing or parked vehicles with location and time.
Outsiders can obscure, dirty or falsify plates and vehicles in public spaces. A plate links through the vehicle register to its registered keeper.
Image recognition reads the plate; the system searches parking rights or police search databases.
Image processing first detects the number-plate region and converts its characters into text. The recognised string may then be checked against a designated database. Image detection, character recognition and database matching are consecutive steps with distinct outputs.
The system reports a match with image, location and time or discards the recording.
The result describes the defined model task. A match, category or forecast acquires its professional significance only in conjunction with the underlying data and intended use.
Enforcement staff or police review matches and impose a penalty, check the vehicle or initiate a search measure.
Integration determines whether the result is simply displayed, adopted after approval or written directly into a business application. These variants differ in their data flows and permissions.
Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.
7 review first10 clarify7 baseline threats
The diagram shows the typical architecture. Select a component to see what happens there and adapt its features to your system. Enable “Analysis guidance” to see which threats need reviewing for this architecture. The page's checklist continues to describe the typical case.
None yet. Each change will appear here.
In this system design: 7 to review first, 10 to clarify, 7 baseline threats.
External access: Depends on your system
To clarify
Input: Part of every AI system
Review first
Third-party content: Present
AI model: Part of every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Provider service: Present
Review first
To clarify
Document collection: Present
Review first
Training and feedback: Present
Review first
To clarify
Result: Part of every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Business application or equipment: Depends on your system
To clarify
person: Part of every AI system
Review first
Affected person: Present
Unapproved AI services: Depends on your system
To clarify
Supply chain and technical foundations: 5 baseline threats applying to every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Intelligent video analytics in public spaces
Recognises events such as fights or heavy objects on vulnerable bridges
Remote biometric identification (facial recognition)
Identifies people by their faces
Outsiders can obscure, dirty or falsify plates and vehicles in public spaces. A plate links through the vehicle register to its registered keeper.
Cameras and image recognition generally come from a provider.
The system searches each plate in a parking rights or police search database.
Depending on the authority, a match automatically triggers a penalty or first requires an enforcement officer's confirmation.
Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.
Assess risks and determine measures
Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.
Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?
Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.
Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.
A total of 24 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.
Also review: whether the system disadvantages groups
Check whether selection, ranking or assessment disadvantages people with protected characteristics, such as sex, age or origin.
The system misreads a dirty, partly obscured or film-altered plate. Another vehicle receives the penalty, or a wanted vehicle escapes detection.
Enforcement staff see many matches each day and may begin confirming them without close inspection. A misread digit then produces a notice against an uninvolved person.
Sensitive Information Disclosure
The system stores location and time for each plate. Leaked or over-retained records reveal who was where and when.
Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning
Falsified training labels can deliberately shift model outputs.
Listed because of this characteristic
Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.
Listed because of this characteristic
Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.
Listed because of this characteristic
RAG-Specific Attacks (Document Poisoning)
Content entering the retrievable knowledge collection can influence answers and subsequent steps.
Listed because of this characteristic
Up to 10 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. Two of these are particularly important here and are therefore listed above.
Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 10 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.
How your system is built
How you operate the system
Depending on the authority, a match automatically triggers a penalty or first requires an enforcement officer's confirmation.
If yes, add
Stored locations and times form movement profiles; police search databases are confidential.
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
These questions arise for almost every AI system.
If yes, add
A scanning vehicle checking plates over a network against a central database depends on that service.
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.
Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.
For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.
Depending on use Review trigger from 2 December 2027.
Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.
Applies since 2 February 2025.
Detailed obligations
Applies if police use matches to assess people or evidence in an investigation.
Applies from 2 December 2027.
Detailed obligations
The system reads vehicle plates and does not analyse people's biometric features.
Detailed obligations
Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass
Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.
If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.
Does the system generate its own text, such as answers, drafts or summaries?
The system returns a recognised plate and a match, rather than text.
If yes, add
Does the system generate or edit images, sounds, voices or videos?
If yes, add
Does the system create new content from open-ended requests that people read, see or hear directly? Translation, reading aloud and transcription do not count.
If yes, add
Can users give the system natural language tasks that it then performs?
If yes, add
Does the system formulate answers from retrieved documents?
If yes, add
Does the system use a knowledge graph storing concepts and their relationships?
If yes, add
Does the system remember content from earlier conversations or tasks and reuse it later?
If yes, add
Does the system call other programs, interfaces or search services itself, even if only to read?
If yes, add
Does the system determine its next steps itself based on earlier results?
If yes, add
Does the system delegate tasks to other AI agents or incorporate their results?
If yes, add
Is the system connected to tools or data sources through the Model Context Protocol (MCP)?
If yes, add
Do documents from several customers, departments or permission groups share one search store?
If yes, add
Can people outside your organisation use the system, including without login?
Only authorities operate the system; the people captured do not use it.
If yes, add
Does the system process several input types together, such as text with images or speech?
If yes, add
Does the system generate code, scripts or database queries for further use?
If yes, add
Does the system execute programs, scripts or commands itself?
If yes, add
Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?
If yes, add
Dutch Algorithm Register, Parkeerhandhaving door middel van een scanauto, Gemeente Delft
The entry describes plate image recognition, human review of matches and deletion of non-violation images within 72 hours.
Dutch Algorithm Register, Scanauto, Gemeente Breda
The entry describes cameras reading plates for parking enforcement since 2020.
Federal Constitutional Court, Order of 18 December 2018, 1 BvR 142/15 (Press release No 8/2019)
The Court describes use in Bavaria and finds that every check interferes with fundamental rights, even without a match.
Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured