Input data and information sources
Images from other practices or hospitals do not originate from the organisation's own equipment. Each image belongs to a patient and carries a name, date of birth and examination data.
Also known as: AI in medical imaging
The system marks abnormalities on X-rays, CT, MRI or mammography images to help clinicians interpret findings.
Understand the use case
The model learns from images with clinically confirmed findings, then marks abnormalities, classifies images or prioritises worklists. These systems operate in German mammography screening; hundreds are authorised as radiology medical devices in the US.
This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.
System design and data flows
X-rays, CT, MRI or mammography images arrive from the hospital or practice image archive.
Images from other practices or hospitals do not originate from the organisation's own equipment. Some systems use earlier images or clinical information alongside the current image.
An image model searches for patterns learned from images with confirmed findings.
The model processes image data to produce annotations, segmentations or indications of unusual structures. These results relate to the selected imaging task and the model used. Their interpretation within an individual patient's findings takes place in the subsequent clinical workflow.
Abnormal regions are marked, with a classification or worklist position.
The result describes the defined model task. A match, category or forecast acquires its professional significance only in conjunction with the underlying data and intended use.
The clinician uses this support to interpret findings and decide on further examination or treatment.
Integration determines whether the result is simply displayed, adopted after approval or written directly into a business application. These variants differ in their data flows and permissions.
Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.
8 review first11 clarify6 baseline threats
The diagram shows the typical architecture. Select a component to see what happens there and adapt its features to your system. Enable “Analysis guidance” to see which threats need reviewing for this architecture. The page's checklist continues to describe the typical case.
None yet. Each change will appear here.
In this system design: 8 to review first, 11 to clarify, 6 baseline threats.
External access: Depends on your system
To clarify
Input: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
Third-party content: Depends on your system
AI model: Part of every AI system
Review first
Provider service: Present
Review first
To clarify
Training and feedback: Present
Review first
To clarify
Result: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Business application or equipment: Depends on your system
To clarify
person: Part of every AI system
Review first
Affected person: Present
Unapproved AI services: Depends on your system
To clarify
Supply chain and technical foundations: 5 baseline threats applying to every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Clinical decision support (such as early sepsis detection)
Continuously analyses vital signs, laboratory values and patient records rather than individual images
Visual and acoustic quality inspection
Inspects components and products in manufacturing
Images from other practices or hospitals do not originate from the organisation's own equipment. Each image belongs to a patient and carries a name, date of birth and examination data.
Systems generally arrive as a manufacturer's medical device.
Some hospitals adapt models using their own images; most use the product unchanged. Corrected findings can return to the manufacturer for future versions.
Depending on integration, the system writes results into the radiology information system or reorders the worklist. Cloud image analysis sends health data outside the organisation's environment.
Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.
Assess risks and determine measures
Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.
Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?
Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.
Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.
A total of 25 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.
Also review: whether the outputs are substantively correct
Check probability reliability, possible test-data leakage into training and the consequences of an error in the business process.
Also review: whether the system disadvantages groups
Check whether selection, ranking or assessment disadvantages people with protected characteristics, such as sex, age or origin.
Also review: Safety of people and equipment
Check independent safety functions, intended operating limits and the safety evidence your sector requires.
Clinicians reviewing many AI-marked images may increasingly focus on marked regions. Unmarked findings are then more easily missed.
New X-ray equipment, different acquisition settings or a different patient group changes images without informing the model. Detection performance silently falls below the level used for product assessment.
If the system prioritises its worklist by classification, apparently normal images move down the queue. A misclassification delays review of an urgent finding.
Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning
Falsified training labels can deliberately shift model outputs.
Listed because of this characteristic
Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.
Listed because of this characteristic
Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.
Listed because of these characteristics
Sensitive Information Disclosure
Confidential content can appear in answers, supplied context or logs.
Listed because of these characteristics
Exfiltration from ML Application
Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.
Listed because of this characteristic
Up to 11 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. Three of these are particularly important here and are therefore listed above.
Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 11 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.
How your system is built
How you operate the system
Most systems mark abnormalities and classify images; some also draft findings.
If yes, add
Depending on integration, the system writes results into the radiology information system or reorders the worklist.
If yes, add
Some hospitals adapt models using their own images; most use the product unchanged.
If yes, add
Corrected findings can return to the manufacturer for future versions.
If yes, add
Some systems use earlier images or clinical information alongside the current image.
If yes, add
These questions arise for almost every AI system.
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.
Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.
For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.
In typical use Review trigger from 2 August 2028.
Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.
Applies since 2 February 2025.
Detailed obligations
Applies if the system is marketed as a medical device under Regulation (EU) 2017/745 and requires notified body assessment, usually the case for diagnostic and early warning software under Rule 11.
Applies from 2 August 2028.
Detailed obligations
Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass
Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.
If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.
Does the system generate or edit images, sounds, voices or videos?
If yes, add
Does the system create new content from open-ended requests that people read, see or hear directly? Translation, reading aloud and transcription do not count.
If yes, add
Can users give the system natural language tasks that it then performs?
The system analyses images and does not accept natural language instructions.
If yes, add
Does the system search its own collection of documents or records for relevant content?
If yes, add
Does the system formulate answers from retrieved documents?
If yes, add
Does the system use a knowledge graph storing concepts and their relationships?
If yes, add
Does the system remember content from earlier conversations or tasks and reuse it later?
If yes, add
Does the system call other programs, interfaces or search services itself, even if only to read?
If yes, add
Does the system determine its next steps itself based on earlier results?
If yes, add
Does the system delegate tasks to other AI agents or incorporate their results?
If yes, add
Is the system connected to tools or data sources through the Model Context Protocol (MCP)?
If yes, add
Do documents from several customers, departments or permission groups share one search store?
If yes, add
Does the system generate code, scripts or database queries for further use?
If yes, add
Does the system execute programs, scripts or commands itself?
If yes, add
Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?
If yes, add
University of Lübeck, AI improves breast cancer detection (PRAIM study), 7 January 2025
The study describes AI in routine German mammography screening, with radiologists still making the findings themselves.
Sivakumar et al., FDA Approval of AI/ML Devices in Radiology, JAMA Network Open 2025
The analysis finds that radiology accounts for most AI medical devices, predominantly with 510(k) clearance rather than approval in the narrower sense.
U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Artificial Intelligence-Enabled Medical Devices
The official inventory lists AI medical devices permitted for US marketing, mostly for radiology.
DIN and DKE, German Standardisation Roadmap for Artificial Intelligence, Second edition
The roadmap treats medicine as a distinct field.
Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured