Input data and information sources
The caller alone determines what is said during the call. Emergency calls contain callers' and affected people's names, addresses and voices.
Also known as: AI-assisted emergency call triage
The system listens during an emergency call and alerts dispatchers to signs of an emergency, such as cardiac arrest.
Understand the use case
Copenhagen's dispatch centre trialled it in live operation. Services in France, Italy and Scotland tested it on recorded calls; Wales has an ongoing research project.
This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.
System design and data flows
Audio from the ongoing emergency call reaches the system directly.
The caller alone determines what is said during the call. Emergency calls contain callers' and affected people's names, addresses and voices.
Speech recognition transcribes the call; a model continually checks the transcript for signs such as cardiac arrest.
The system processes information from the ongoing call, for example through speech recognition and analysis of relevant terms or patterns. It provides the control room with indications of a possible emergency. Decisions on follow-up questions, urgency and deployment of resources take place within the designated control-room process.
An indication appears for the dispatcher while the call is still underway.
The result describes the defined model task. A match, category or forecast acquires its professional significance only in conjunction with the underlying data and intended use.
The centre determines urgency and whether to guide callers through resuscitation.
Integration determines whether the result is simply displayed, adopted after approval or written directly into a business application. These variants differ in their data flows and permissions.
Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.
7 review first9 clarify7 baseline threats
The diagram shows the typical architecture. Select a component to see what happens there and adapt its features to your system. Enable “Analysis guidance” to see which threats need reviewing for this architecture. The page's checklist continues to describe the typical case.
None yet. Each change will appear here.
In this system design: 7 to review first, 9 to clarify, 7 baseline threats.
External access: Depends on your system
To clarify
Input: Part of every AI system
Review first
Baseline for every AI system
Third-party content: Present
AI model: Part of every AI system
Review first
Provider service: Present
Review first
To clarify
Training and feedback: Present
Review first
To clarify
Result: Part of every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Business application or equipment: Depends on your system
To clarify
person: Part of every AI system
Review first
Affected person: Present
Unapproved AI services: Depends on your system
To clarify
Supply chain and technical foundations: 5 baseline threats applying to every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Speech recognition and transcription
Only transcribes conversations without checking for emergency signs
Customer service chatbots and voicebots
Answers and handles calls itself
Clinical decision support (such as early sepsis detection)
Analyses vital signs and patient records in hospitals
The caller alone determines what is said during the call. Emergency calls contain callers' and affected people's names, addresses and voices.
All documented uses rely on one manufacturer's system.
In the pilots, the manufacturer trained the model on recordings from each dispatch centre. New recordings with confirmed diagnoses can improve the model later.
Depending on integration, it only displays the indication or sets an incident category or urgency in dispatch software itself. In the pilots, the manufacturer held the training recordings.
Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.
Assess risks and determine measures
Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.
Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?
Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.
Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.
A total of 23 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.
Also review: whether the outputs are substantively correct
Check probability reliability, possible test-data leakage into training and the consequences of an error in the business process.
Also review: whether the system disadvantages groups
Check whether selection, ranking or assessment disadvantages people with protected characteristics, such as sex, age or origin.
Also review: Safety of people and equipment
Check independent safety functions, intended operating limits and the safety evidence your sector requires.
A dispatcher relying on cardiac arrest alerts may stop asking targeted questions when none appears. Telephone resuscitation instructions then begin too late.
A model trained on one centre's calls performs worse with different languages, dialects or questioning practices. Pilots in France, Italy and Scotland therefore first trained it on local recordings.
Sensitive Information Disclosure
Real call recordings go to the manufacturer for training and evaluation. Unauthorised disclosure of voices and health information causes irreversible harm.
Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning
Falsified training labels can deliberately shift model outputs.
Listed because of this characteristic
Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.
Listed because of this characteristic
Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.
Listed because of these characteristics
Exfiltration from ML Application
Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.
Listed because of this characteristic
Up to 9 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. Two of these are particularly important here and are therefore listed above.
Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 9 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.
How your system is built
How you operate the system
Depending on integration, it only displays the indication or sets an incident category or urgency in dispatch software itself.
If yes, add
In the pilots, the manufacturer trained the model on recordings from each dispatch centre.
If yes, add
If yes, add
New recordings with confirmed diagnoses can improve the model later.
If yes, add
These questions arise for almost every AI system.
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.
Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.
For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.
In typical use Review trigger from 2 December 2027.
Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.
Applies since 2 February 2025.
Detailed obligations
Applies if the system assesses calls during the conversation and gives dispatchers urgency indications, such as possible cardiac arrest.
Applies from 2 December 2027.
Detailed obligations
The caller speaks to a person at the centre rather than the system. The obligation to disclose AI interaction therefore generally does not apply.
Detailed obligations
Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass
Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.
If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.
Does the system generate its own text, such as answers, drafts or summaries?
The system displays indications; a transcript only reproduces what was said.
If yes, add
Does the system generate or edit images, sounds, voices or videos?
If yes, add
Does the system create new content from open-ended requests that people read, see or hear directly? Translation, reading aloud and transcription do not count.
If yes, add
Can users give the system natural language tasks that it then performs?
The system listens and does not accept instructions.
If yes, add
Does the system search its own collection of documents or records for relevant content?
If yes, add
Does the system formulate answers from retrieved documents?
If yes, add
Does the system use a knowledge graph storing concepts and their relationships?
If yes, add
Does the system remember content from earlier conversations or tasks and reuse it later?
If yes, add
Does the system call other programs, interfaces or search services itself, even if only to read?
If yes, add
Does the system determine its next steps itself based on earlier results?
If yes, add
Does the system delegate tasks to other AI agents or incorporate their results?
If yes, add
Is the system connected to tools or data sources through the Model Context Protocol (MCP)?
If yes, add
Do documents from several customers, departments or permission groups share one search store?
If yes, add
Does the system process several input types together, such as text with images or speech?
The system analyses only the conversation.
If yes, add
Does the system generate code, scripts or database queries for further use?
If yes, add
Does the system execute programs, scripts or commands itself?
If yes, add
Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?
If yes, add
With alerts, staff recognised 93.1 rather than 90.5 per cent of cardiac arrests, a non-significant difference; the model alone detected more but generated more false alarms.
The trial register describes the Copenhagen study conducted in live dispatch operations.
EENA and Corti, Detecting out-of-hospital cardiac arrest using artificial intelligence, Project report, 13 January 2020 According to the manufacturer
EENA and manufacturer Corti staff describe pilots at AREU (Lombardy) and SDIS-SAMU 74 (Haute-Savoie), which trained the model on their own calls.
Scottish Ambulance Service, Emergency Call Artificial Intelligence Pilot Trial According to the deployer
The service describes a four-month Corti trial on copied calls without operational intervention; transferred data is deleted afterwards.
University of York, Assuring Autonomy, ASSIST: AI in ambulance service 999 calls
The project adapts the Copenhagen platform for the Welsh Ambulance Service to support cardiac arrest recognition during call handling.
Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 (EU AI Act), Annex III, point 5(d)
Annex III lists AI systems evaluating and classifying emergency calls, dispatching responders or prioritising emergency patients.
Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured