Versatile AI Risk Assessment
Biometrics and emotion recognition

Biometric verification and video identification

Also known as: Biometric verification and remote identity proofing

The system checks whether a person is who they claim to be, for example by comparing a live image with their ID photograph.

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A concise PDF covering how the system works, its data flows and points to investigate, ready to share.

The explanations and measures describe the typical system design. Extensive personal changes add an appendix.

Understand the use case

What defines this use case?

The person shows their ID and face to the camera. The system compares the images and checks that a real person is present, rather than a photograph, mask or replayed video. Border controls and government portals use this approach; Germany's BSI publishes a technical guideline for video identification.

This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.

System design
Analysis and processing
Ability to act
Action permissions depend on integration
Fields of use
border control, digital public services
Also known as
face-to-ID matching, liveness check, video identification, eGate

How it works, step by step

System design and data flows

  1. Input data

    The person presents or photographs their ID and shows their face to the camera.

    The person supplies the ID and camera image; they may be impersonating someone else. In video identification, the system checks live images, ID photographs and often audio together.

  2. Processing

    The system checks that a live person is present and compares their face with the ID photograph.

    The system compares a captured biometric characteristic with the reference for a claimed identity. Unlike searching an entire population database, this verifies a single identity claim. Liveness detection may be an additional check, where it is integrated.

  3. Results

    The system reports whether the images show the same person, usually with a match score.

    The result describes the defined model task. A match, category or forecast acquires its professional significance only in conjunction with the underlying data and intended use.

  4. Use and impact

    A match opens the barrier, creates the account or enables login; otherwise, a person investigates further.

    Integration determines whether the result is simply displayed, adopted after approval or written directly into a business application. These variants differ in their data flows and permissions.

Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.

How the system is built

13 review first4 clarify7 baseline threats

InputProcessingResultImpact Externalaccess 50 Input 50 Third-partycontent 00 AI model 00 Providerservice 11 Documentcollection 00 Memory 00 Training andfeedback 11 OtherAI agents 00 Tools andinterfaces 00 Result 10 Business appor equipment 01 person 00 Affectedperson 00 AI serviceswithout approval 01 Externalaccess 50 Input 50 Third-partycontent 00 AI model 00 Providerservice 11 Documentcollection 00 Memory 00 Training andfeedback 11 OtherAI agents 00 Tools andinterfaces 00 Result 10 Business appor equipment 01 person 00 Affectedperson 00 AI serviceswithout approval 01
  • Present
  • Depends on your system
  • Absent
  • Review first
  • To clarify

In this system design: 13 to review first, 4 to clarify, 7 baseline threats.

Architecture as a list

How it differs from similar use cases

Data and information

Input data and information sources

The person supplies the ID and camera image; they may be impersonating someone else. The system processes the person's facial image, name and identity document data.

Processing and operating environment

Deployers generally purchase face matching and liveness detection from specialist providers, such as iProov for GOV.UK One Login.

Storage and further use

Logging, retention periods and possible use for training must be established for the specific implementation.

Results and data sharing

Depending on the procedure, a positive result activates an account directly or requires human confirmation first. If checks run in a provider's cloud, facial images and ID data leave the organisation's environment.

Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.

Assess risks and determine measures

From understanding the system to analysing risks

  1. Define the system boundary

    Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.

  2. Investigate threats

    Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?

  3. Assess risk

    Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.

  4. Provide evidence of measures

    Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.

Key threats in the application context

  • 3 particularly important
  • 10 typical
  • 4 depending on the system
  • 7 additional threats for every AI system

A total of 24 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.

Also review: whether the system disadvantages groups

Check whether selection, ranking or assessment disadvantages people with protected characteristics, such as sex, age or origin.

Priority review points

  1. Adversarial Inputs

    An impersonator presents a photograph, mask or synthetic video to the camera. If it defeats liveness detection, the system opens an account or barrier for the wrong person.

  2. Insecure Output Handling

    Downstream processes treat the result as a verified identity. Accepting it without further checks means a single error can create an account or grant access under a false name.

  3. Multimodal Attacks

    Injecting a synthetic video directly into the camera stream bypasses liveness detection without anyone standing before the camera. The system then confirms an identity nobody has physically presented.

10 further review candidates in the typical design

Other relevant threats

  1. Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning

    Falsified training labels can deliberately shift model outputs.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Learns from examples with correct answers
  2. Backdoor ML Model

    Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Uses another provider's model
  3. Model Theft

    Anyone able to query the model can replicate it through many queries. Internally trained weights can be stolen through network access.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Available to people outside the organisation
  4. Model Denial of Service

    Complex or high-volume inputs can exhaust model computing resources.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Available to people outside the organisation
    • Processes text, images and speech together
  5. Cost Harvesting / Repurposing

    Paid or publicly triggered queries can be abused to consume computing resources and money.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Available to people outside the organisation
  6. Privacy Attacks

    Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Processes personal data
    • Processes confidential data
    • Recognises or compares people by physical features
  7. Sensitive Information Disclosure

    Confidential content can appear in answers, supplied context or logs.

    Listed because of these characteristics

    • Processes personal data
    • Processes confidential data
  8. Exfiltration from ML Application

    Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Processes confidential data
  9. Application Denial of Service

    A network-accessible application can be overwhelmed by mass requests.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Available to people outside the organisation
  10. Model Reconnaissance

    Targeted queries can reveal the model's architecture and safeguards.

    Listed because of this characteristic

    • Available to people outside the organisation

Up to 4 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. Two of these are particularly important here and are therefore listed above.

System features and open questions

Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 4 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.

How many threats a Yes adds
  • Added by this Yes

How your system is built

Can the system change things itself, such as storing data, sending messages, initiating transactions or granting permissions?

Depending on the procedure, a positive result activates an account directly or requires human confirmation first.

If yes, add

Does the system directly move or control something physical, such as motors, valves, vehicles or temperatures?

At an automated border gate, a positive result opens the barrier.

If yes, add

Does your organisation train or fine-tune the model itself using its own data?

If yes, add

How you operate the system

These questions arise for almost every AI system.

Controls and implementation

Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.

Review priorityAdversarial Inputs2 measures
Review priorityInsecure Output Handling3 measures
Review priorityMultimodal Attacks2 measures
Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning3 measures
Backdoor ML Model2 measures
Model Theft3 measures
Model Denial of Service3 measures
Cost Harvesting / Repurposing3 measures
Privacy Attacks3 measures
Sensitive Information Disclosure3 measures
Exfiltration from ML Application3 measures
Application Denial of Service3 measures
Model Reconnaissance3 measures

Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.

AI Act provisions

When AI Act provisions apply
  1. Art. 4: AI literacy

    For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.

  2. Annex III no. 7: Migration, asylum and border control

    Depending on use Review trigger from 2 December 2027.

Applies to every AI system

Art. 4: AI literacy

Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.

Applies since 2 February 2025.

Obligations and details for Art. 4: AI literacy
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Product manufacturer, Provider of a general-purpose AI model

Detailed obligations

May apply in particular uses

Annex III no. 7: Migration, asylum and border control

Applies if border authorities use the system to recognise or identify people beyond checking travel documents.

Applies from 2 December 2027.

Obligations and details for Annex III no. 7: Migration, asylum and border control
The general condition is
Applies if the system is used in examining asylum, visa or residence applications or at border controls.
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Product manufacturer

Detailed obligations

Generally does not apply

Annex III no. 1 point a: Remote biometric identification

The system only confirms the identity claimed by an actively participating person. Annex III, point 1(a), expressly excludes this verification.

Obligations and details for Annex III no. 1 point a: Remote biometric identification
The general condition is
Applies if the system identifies people remotely using biometric features.
Exception
Systems that only confirm a person's claimed identity.
Who bears the obligations
Provider, Deployer, Product manufacturer

Detailed obligations

Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass

Cross-cutting threats

Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.

Why these threats always belong on the checklist

Atypical system features

View 16 further questions

If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.

Sources

Related use cases

Also in the field of Biometrics and emotion recognition

Often used together with

Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured