Input data and information sources
The collection contains emails, contracts and documents written by outsiders. Emails and files identify staff, parties and third parties.
Also known as: E-discovery, technology-assisted review (TAR)
The system ranks large document collections by their likely relevance to an investigation or information request, making review easier.
Understand the use case
A UK regulator, a Dutch province and a US department use these systems.
This page describes a typical system design. Actual data flows and permissions depend on your implementation.
System design and data flows
An investigation or information request brings together a large collection of emails, files and records.
The collection contains emails, contracts and documents written by outsiders. Emails and files identify staff, parties and third parties.
Specialists assess a sample, and the model continually learns which documents are likely to be relevant.
The system prepares the document collection for search and comparison and evaluates documents against the investigation question. The results may help prioritise review. A ranking expresses estimated relevance; it replaces neither reading the document nor the professional judgement of its significance.
The system ranks documents by likely relevance and estimates how many relevant documents remain unread.
The result describes the defined model task. A match, category or forecast acquires its professional significance only in conjunction with the underlying data and intended use.
The ranking determines what people read, what is disclosed and what supports an investigation.
The model supplies information for subsequent use. Selection, adoption or a professional decision in the following workflow is a separate step and should not automatically be attributed to the model.
Explore the system design: Select a component to see its task, incoming and outgoing data, and role in the use case. The guided walkthrough explains each phase. Then use Yes, Uncertain and No to represent your specific system variant.
8 review first15 clarify8 baseline threats
The diagram shows the typical architecture. Select a component to see what happens there and adapt its features to your system. Enable “Analysis guidance” to see which threats need reviewing for this architecture. The page's checklist continues to describe the typical case.
None yet. Each change will appear here.
In this system design: 8 to review first, 15 to clarify, 8 baseline threats.
External access: Depends on your system
To clarify
Input: Part of every AI system
Review first
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
Third-party content: Present
AI model: Part of every AI system
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
Provider service: Present
To clarify
Document collection: Present
Review first
To clarify
Training and feedback: Present
Review first
Result: Part of every AI system
To clarify
Baseline for every AI system
person: Part of every AI system
Review first
Affected person: Depends on your system
Unapproved AI services: Depends on your system
To clarify
Supply chain and technical foundations: 5 baseline threats applying to every AI system
Baseline for every AI system
Automated anonymisation and redaction
Only finds and redacts personal information in documents already selected
AI knowledge assistant (enterprise search)
Answers questions from a document collection rather than ranking documents
The collection contains emails, contracts and documents written by outsiders. Emails and files identify staff, parties and third parties.
The platform and learning method come from providers such as Relativity or ZyLAB.
The system makes the collection searchable and finds documents similar to those already judged relevant. For each case, the model learns afresh from reviewers' assessments.
On a cloud platform, the provider holds the entire investigation collection.
Using a provider does not automatically determine where processing takes place. Storage location, subcontractors, deletion periods and use for training must be checked for the specific deployment.
Assess risks and determine measures
Record data, participants, interfaces and permissions. Resolve uncertain characteristics in the model.
Relate review candidates to actual data flows: what could happen, and who would be affected?
Assess impacts and likelihood in the deployment context. The number of review candidates is not a risk score.
Select appropriate controls, assign responsibilities and define effectiveness checks. Document residual risks and approvals.
A total of 31 threats from the threat catalogue may be relevant to this use case.
Targeted Poisoning / Label Poisoning
A reviewer accidentally or deliberately marks incriminating documents as irrelevant. The model learns from this and moves similar documents to the bottom, where nobody reads them.
Review ends when the model expects few relevant documents to remain. If that estimate is wrong, important records remain unread and the gap goes unnoticed.
Sensitive Information Disclosure
The collection brings trade secrets and personnel records from many parties onto one platform. Overly broad permissions expose more information to reviewers or third parties than the case requires.
Your own training or operational feedback can introduce manipulated data into training datasets.
Listed because of these characteristics
Training data or an adopted base model can introduce hidden triggers for misbehaviour.
Listed because of these characteristics
Targeted queries can recover some personal or protected training data from the model.
Listed because of these characteristics
Exfiltration from ML Application
Protected data can leak through tools, network connections, storage or insiders.
Listed because of this characteristic
RAG-Specific Attacks (Document Poisoning)
Content entering the retrievable knowledge collection can influence answers and subsequent steps.
Listed because of this characteristic
Up to 15 further threats may apply, depending on your system design. Nine threats need to be reviewed for every AI system. One of these is particularly important here and is therefore listed above.
Each Yes adds further threats to your checklist, up to 15 in total. If you cannot yet answer a question, include its threats in your review.
How your system is built
How you operate the system
Traditional approaches only rank documents. Newer platforms use a language model to summarise documents or explain their relevance.
If yes, add
A language model reviewing documents may follow instructions contained within them.
If yes, add
If several cases' or clients' collections share one platform, search and permissions must keep them separate.
If yes, add
If yes, add
These questions arise for almost every AI system.
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
If yes, add
Measures for the priority review areas are expanded. Each linked measure explains how to implement it.
Controls for the remaining threats are available on their pages in the threat catalogue.
For every AI system Applies since 2 February 2025.
Depending on use Review trigger from 2 December 2027.
Applies if staff or appointed representatives operate or use AI systems.
Applies since 2 February 2025.
Detailed obligations
Applies if a law enforcement authority uses the system to assess the reliability of evidence in investigations.
Applies from 2 December 2027.
Detailed obligations
Authorities and law firms review documents for proceedings. The system does not help the court itself establish or interpret facts.
Detailed obligations
Classify your system with the quick checker All obligations in the obligations compass
Review these threats for every AI system, whatever its purpose.
If any of these features does apply to your system, add the listed threats.
Does the system generate or edit images, sounds, voices or videos?
If yes, add
Does the system create new content from open-ended requests that people read, see or hear directly? Translation, reading aloud and transcription do not count.
If yes, add
Does the system use a knowledge graph storing concepts and their relationships?
If yes, add
Does the system remember content from earlier conversations or tasks and reuse it later?
If yes, add
Does the system call other programs, interfaces or search services itself, even if only to read?
If yes, add
Can the system change things itself, such as storing data, sending messages, initiating transactions or granting permissions?
If yes, add
Does the system determine its next steps itself based on earlier results?
If yes, add
Does the system delegate tasks to other AI agents or incorporate their results?
If yes, add
Is the system connected to tools or data sources through the Model Context Protocol (MCP)?
If yes, add
Does the system directly move or control something physical, such as motors, valves, vehicles or temperatures?
If yes, add
Can people outside your organisation use the system, including without login?
If yes, add
Does the system generate code, scripts or database queries for further use?
If yes, add
Does the system execute programs, scripts or commands itself?
If yes, add
Is the system intended to maximise a specified metric, such as revenue, utilisation or clicks?
If yes, add
UK Algorithmic Transparency Record, Care Quality Commission: Relativity Active Learning
A machine learning model (support vector machine) ranks documents by relevance to an investigation.
Dutch Algorithm Register, Ondersteuning Openbaarmakingsverzoeken, Provincie Noord-Holland
The province indexes, analyses and redacts documents using ZyLAB.
US Federal AI Use Case Inventory 2024, raw data
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lists RelativityOne in its AI use case inventory.
Updated: 30 September 2026. Review checklist rules version 0.3.2, threat catalogue version 2026.10.24.2. How these pages are structured